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Abstract 
This article analyzes the effect of speculation on the economic welfare from various criteria, 
using a simple Edgeworth box within a three-period Walrasian competition framework. 
Here “speculation” is defined as a series of transition processes of each agent’s spontaneous 
production of private information, the exchange of commodities based on it under the 
externality environment, and finally its spillover into public. The methodology and 
implications are closely related with the concepts of herd behavior by Banerjee (1992), 
informational externality by Stein (1987), information sharing by Shapiro (1985), and 
economic value of speculation by Hirshleifer (1971, 1975, 1977). It is explicitly shown that 
the complete sharing of produced information under externality environment, if not 
accompanied by almost sure productivity effect, does not necessarily attain the non-negative 
economic value especially in terms of ex-ante expected utility. The implication is consistent 
with Aoki (2005). Lastly some criticisms about why this could happen are discussed. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, on the basis of the model set in my previous paper (“Models of 
equilibrium pricing with internalized powers of independent judgment based on autonomy”, 
February 2000), we state a simple model for a speculation mechanism, and analyze its 
impact on the welfare, and present some problems in the decision-making theory.  
According to the information theory, the information is, if produced, supposed to 
make the prediction regarding the state of the world surer, on the other hand, it is 
inherently a probabilistic variable, therefore it may be fallible. It is a well-known fact that, 
given the payoff function exogenously, the information does always have a non-negative 
economic value.1-1 Consequently, an agent may be expected to become better off by means of 
speculation, that is, by producing private information, as defined later in this paper. On the 
other hand, some related literatures tell us that the existence of informational asymmetry 
may distort the social welfare and may lead to a negative externality on each agent’s welfare. 
Therefore, the general influence of information on the economic systems is, in spite of 
historical literatures regarding information and speculation, not necessarily clear.1-2  
While this paper owes its theoretical foundation to a series of literatures listed in 
the references, however, the points we carefully consider and newly focus on in this paper 
are as follows. 
                                                   
1-1 For the rigorous calculation, see Appendix [A] of Aoki (2000).  
1-2 Aoki (2007) analyzes the effect of information sharing in a vertical market structure with a 
Bertrand setting, applying some concepts of “shared/private information” equilibria originally 
developed by Shapiro (1986), and shows that its effect regarding symmetrization, not productivity, 
under externality environment might not necessarily attain the non-negative economic value.  
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1. Although it is rather clear that speculation can be explained by speculator’s rationality 
based on her private information, there seems to be no existing literatures, which extract 
the essence of speculation dynamics within the simplest and classical economic framework, 
and in addition succeed in deriving some general conclusion regarding welfare analysis, 
which is not really specific to the model. 
2. There seems to be a strong necessity that we discuss more rigorously and explicitly about 
what the value of information is like over an infinite time horizon, and what speculation 
eventually brings about in terms of the ex-ante expected welfare including the economic 
effect for “other” agents. For example, where privately created information spills over 
perfectly instantaneously, the equilibrium price is to be adjusted also perfectly 
instantaneously without any transaction of commodities. However, since it does not 
realistically illustrate what is actually going on in observed financial markets, we need to 
set at least one period, in which private information itself is not transacted with price and 
commodities are traded on the basis only of private information, which may be exclusive to 
that agent of the overall information set of that period. In other words, we need to analyze 
the externality of information, which is the same concern as in Stein (1987). 
3. However, some historical literatures as by Akerlof (1970), already point out that the 
asymmetry in information may distort the social welfare, so in order to remove the negative 
effect purely caused by the asymmetry in information and to measure the economic effect of 
speculation in a true sense, we need to set, after the period processing speculation, another 
period for adjustment process in which the privately produced information or the true states 
of the world spill over into public and all agents come to share the common information, 
which surely enhances the ex-ante welfare for every agents, compared with in the previous 
period of speculation. 
4. We need to describe more carefully whether speculation is economically rational at least 
for a speculator (an informationally superior agent) or not in the ex-ante sense, even if it is 
invoked on the “private” or “partial” information, or on the “false” information. Actually we 
proved that it is, in Proposition 2 and 3. 
5. The information as defined in the information theory is “informative” because of the 
“almost no-correlation” with the existing overall information set, but is also “fallible” 
because of the very aspect. In this sense, information merely raises a “mean-preserving 
spread” in terms of prediction, as Hirshleifer (1977, 1975, 1971) expresses it as a “random 
walk” (Remember that in a risk averse economy, the mean-preserving spread of allocations 
leads to a decrease in the expected utility.). There seem to be no existing works, which 
explicitly analyze the economic effect of this aspect, the “fallibility” in information within a 
competitive, risk averse, dynamic economy, although Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1985) discuss it 
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in the context of organizational economics.            
In this paper, in order to answer these points, we state a simple model for a speculation 
mechanism, as an economic process for producing a private information, and analyze its 
impact on the welfare, and present some problems in the decision-making theory. 
Specifically, the model is constructed on Walrasian equilibrium transition processes over 
three periods, and on Shannon’s famous definition of “information”. This paper is similar to 
the implications and methodology of Banerjee (1992), in which the mechanism of herd 
behavior is analyzed from the viewpoints of information revelation and Bayesian inference, 
and the resulting inefficiency is explicitly stated. In this article we are just trying to be more 
rigorous by focusing on the role of informational externality, in which the produced 
information itself is not incorporated within an economic transaction of commodities, by 
removing the negative effect of informational asymmetry, and by analyzing the impact on 
the overall exchange economy. For reference, De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann 
(1987), Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), Harrison and Kreps (1978), Hong and Stein (1987), 
Stein (1987) treat informational aspects of speculation, and Harris and Townsend (1981) 
considers resource allocation under asymmetric information. Some other insightful analyses 
regarding the economic value of information appear, for example, Bode and Thunik (1998) 
and Mahieu and Bauer (1998). 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic concepts 
used in this paper. Section 3 explains the three-period setting of the equilibrium transition 
incorporating the adjustment process of information, and some criteria needed for the 
welfare analysis, which should be one of the main parts of this paper in section 6. In section 
4, we describe a decision-making mechanism for speculation, and prove some fundamental 
economic features of it, taking the equilibrium price vector exogenously as given. In section 
5, we analyze the effect of speculation mainly using an Edgeworth box within a Walrasian 
competition framework, and in section 6, we summarize all these welfare analysis under the 
three-period setting.    
 
2. Basic Model 
Assume that there exists a world, which incorporates uncertainty. The state of the 
world is described as a binary random variable, M, so that M=1 or M=0. The true (real) value 
of M is not revealed as least at the initial period, t=0. The period is described as a discrete 
number, t=0, 1, 2,…. Two agents, i=1, 2, exchange two commodities, k=1, 2, as Walrasian 
competitors. Commodity 1 is a riskless asset, and therefore the utility does not depend on 
the state variable, M. Commodity 2 is a risky asset, so the utility does depend on M. Hence, 
we assume that agent i has a separable and state-dependent utility function as follows; 
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)()()( ,22,11, tijitiitii xuxuxU +=  if M=j (j=1,0)  (2.1) 
where we denote agent i's bundle vector in equilibrium at the end of period t, by 
),( ,2,1, tititi xxx = , and tikx ,  is an amount of the holdings for commodity k. We also assume 
that the initial endowment vector of each agent i, which is denoted by ),( 0,20,10, iii xxx = , is 
already given. As for the utility functions, we set the following ordinary properties. 
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(2) An increasing and concave (risk averse) function with the commodity holdings: 
0)(' ,11 >tii xu , 0)('' ,11 <tii xu , 0)(' ,22 >tiji xu , 0)('' ,22 <tiji xu  (2.3) 
These assumptions just ensure that a short sale (i.e., 0, <tikx ) cannot happen. (Actually, 
0, >tikx  is ensured.) In addition, we assume the following property for some convenience to 
draw the contract curve in the Edgeworth box, which we will describe later. 
(3) Linear relations between states and between commodities: 
.)(/)( 0212 constxuxu ii == g   
.)(/)( 102 constxuxu ii =¢= g  for all 0>x    (2.4) 
The following common form of the utility functions for both agents satisfies all of (1), (2) and 
(3), as well as having a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), a , so we adopt 
this form of functions for computational analysis in this paper.2-1 
atiti
i xxu -= 1,11,11 )()( g  where 01 >g .  
                                                   
2-1 Here we need to emphasize that, in this paper, we do not take account of any (positive) endogenous 
economic effect regarding the profitability of a risky commodity (2), j2g , as discussed in section 7. So, 
the output results of information produced by agents do not influence, with some economic feedback, 
the form of each agent’s utility, (2.5) at all. Using the notations in (7.1) of footnote 7-3, this is 
equivalent to 01,00,10,01,1 ==== eeee . 
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 atijtiji xxu -= 1,22,22 )()( g  if jM = , where 00212 >> gg . (2.5) 
Each agent i has respectively a “subjective” prediction regarding the state of the 
world, M. We denote it by )|1(Pr itit Mob F=ºb , the probability that M=1 conditional on 
i
tF , where itF  is an information set which is privately available only for agent i at the end 
of period t. Apart from her own prediction, itb , each agent i may be able to make use of her 
inner information production function. We denote the private binary information, which is 
personally produced by agent i, by iD , where the output of )( lDi =  takes the binary value, 
0,1=l . In terms of the information theory, the performance vector, ),( 01 ii PP , of this 
function is defined as follows.2-2 
 ii PMDob 1)1|1(Pr º==  
i
i PMDob 0)0|1(Pr º==     (2.6) 
That is, we denote the probability that 1=iD  is output conditionally on M=j, by ijP . We 
assume that ),( 01 ii PP  (i=1,2) are publicly known to both agents i=1,2. In addition, for 
simplicity, we assume that 5.01 01 ³-= ii PP . Therefore, as )1( 01 ii PP -=  approaches 1, 
we expect that a surer prediction can be obtained by producing the private information. The 
cost of producing information is denoted by iC  in terms of the utility. As long as there is no 
special comment on it, we assume that 0=iC , that is, the cost of producing information is 
zero 2-3. Each agent i, if she produces her private information, iD , or if she can observe the 
other agent’s disclosed information, iD- 2-4, then she changes the prediction regarding the 
state of the world, according to the Bayesian inference. In this case, the information set of 
agent i at period t is represented as }'{ '1 lDiitit =ÈF=F -  for i’=i, or –i. For example, 
                                                   
2-2 This definition was proposed, for the first time, by Shannon ([13]). 
2-3 Strictly speaking, in order to avoid an infinite repetition of producing a private information, that is, 
exercising speculation, it may be more appropriate to set the cost of producing information at an 
infinitely small positive number e , that is, 0>= eiC . 
2-4 We denote the other agent by –i. Therefore, -i=2 for i=1 and -i=1 for i=2. 
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assume that at the beginning of period t, agent i has produced a private information, iD . 
Then, as a function of her previous prediction, )|1(Pr 11 itit Mob -- F=ºb , and the output of 
)( lDi = , she gets a new prediction as following.2-5  
If 1=iD , then: 
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Here, )(~ lDiit =b  denotes the posterior Bayesian prediction of agent i at period t with the 
occurrence, lDi =  at period t under the last information set, it 1-F . We also denote the 
overall collected set of all information, which each agent respectively holds at period t, by 
)( 21 ttt FÈFºF . For example, assume }1{ 11 ==F Dt and }0{ 22 ==F Dt . Then, we have 
}0,1{ 21 ===F DDt . At the initial period 0, we assume that i0F  is a null set (denoted by 
}{f ), so that we have }{02010 f=F=F=F  and 
5.0}){|1(Pr 00 =º=F== afb ii Mob , where a  is the common value of both agents’ 
initial predictions. Using this overall information set, tF , we can define the “objective” 
prediction at period t by )|1(Pr tt Mob F=ºb . 
At each period t, each agent i behaves herself as a Walrasian competitor, based on 
her own current prediction, itb , which has just been renewed at the beginning of the period, 
and taking her last bundle, ),( 1,21,11, --- = tititi xxx , as her endowment. Then, finally a new 
Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium is reached, and a new allocation-price pair, ),( tt qx , 
                                                   
2-5 Also see Appendix 2 for more neat calculation. It is easily verified that if 5.0)1( 01 =-= ii PP , 
then we have itiit lD 1)(~ -== bb  for 0,1=l . 
 8 
where ),( ,2,1 ttt xxx =  is an equilibrium allocation vector, and ),( 21 ttt qqq =  ( tkq  for 
commodity k) is a new equilibrium price vector, are determined at the end of the period t. As 
explained later in Chapter 4 for the mechanism of speculation, whether each agent should 
produce a private information or not at the beginning of the period, is to be decided entirely 
from the viewpoint of her (ex-ante) expected utility. Given her prediction, 
)|1(Pr itit Mob F=ºb , which is calculated conditionally on her available information set, 
i
tF , agent i’s expected utility for holding a bundle vector, ),( 21 xxx = , is calculated as 
follows. 
[ ] { }
ai
t
i
t
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i
i
ti
i
ti
i
ti
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xuxuxuxUE
-- -++=
-++ºF
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2
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)()1()()(|)(
gbgbg
bb  (2.8) 
Here, for the distinct two bundle vectors, ),( 21 xxx =  and )','(' 21 xxx = , we say that, iff 
[ ] [ ]itiiti xUExUE F£F |)'(|)( , then the bundle 'x  is as least as good as the bundle x  for 
agent i, conditionally on the information set, itF , or equivalently with the prediction, itb . 
We denote this by ')( xx itF , or equivalently by 'xx itb .3  Similarly, we say that, iff 
[ ] [ ]itiiti xUExUE F<F |)'(|)( , then the bundle 'x  is better off than the bundle x  for 
agent i, conditionally on the information set, itF , or equivalently with the prediction, itb , 
denoting it by ')( xx itF , or equivalently by 'xx itb . 
Since each agent is a Walrasian competitor, takes her last equilibrium bundle, 
),( 1,21,11, --- = tititi xxx , as an endowment, and her current prediction, itb , as given, the 
demand function and the indirect utility function of agent i at period t are well defined as 
follows. 
 [ ]iti
xxx
i
t
tii
D xUEqxx F= =
- |)(maxarg),,(
),(
1,
21
b   s.t. 1, -×£× tixqxq   
                                                   
3 This notation is originally and explicitly used in the preliminary version of Aoki (2003). 
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[ ]itixxxittii xUEqxv F= =- |)(max),,( ),(1, 21b   s.t 1, -×£× tixqxq  (2.9) 
where ),( 21 qqq =  is a price vector. Therefore, the Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium 
allocation-price pair ),( tt qx  at period t, where ),( ,2,1 ttt xxx = , is also well defined such 
that: 
 (1) ),,( 1,, tittiiDti qxxx b-=  for i=1,2 
 (2) 1,21,1,2,1 -- +=+ tttt xxxx     (2.10) 
Since ),( tt qx  is also in a Walrasian equilibrium with the endowment allocation, 
),( ,2,1 ttt xxx = , and the current prediction, itb , we have: 
 ),,( ,, tittiiDti qxxx b=  for i=1,2     (2.11) 
We assume that the initial endowment bundle vector of each agent i, ),( 0,20,10, iii xxx = , 
satisfies; 
)0.1,0.1(0,1 ssx --=  and )0.1,0.1(0,2 ssx ++=  where 11 ££- s   
       (2.12) 
so that we have 0,20,1 ii xx =  for i=1,2, and the total endowment vector is always 
)0.2,0.2(,2,1 =+= tt xxw  for all t. For the F.O.C. equilibrium conditions, see Appendix 1. 
The assumptions (2.2) and (2.3) assure that the preference of each agent is convex, 
continuous and monotonic, irrespective of the values of itb  (i=1,2), and that the 
equilibrium allocation-price pair, ),( tt qx , is always unique and strictly positive in every 
element, that is, 0),( >>tt qx . In addition, the form of utility functions represented by (2.4) 
has a very convenient property for the welfare analysis. That is, although, given these utility 
functions, the “subjective” contract curve (Pareto set) on the Edgeworth box shifts depending 
on agents’ predictions, itb ’s, or equivalently on agents’ information sets, itF ’s, it is always 
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an identical straight line irrespective of the values of itb , if 21 tt bb = , that is, if two agents 
have the same prediction at the period t. See Figure 1. Line 'OO  is corresponding to this 
contract curve (a straight line, actually). In other words, whenever the predictions of both 
agents are the same (i.e., 21 tt bb = ), the equilibrium would be always reached on this 
straight line. We can also regard the line 'OO , as an “objective” contract curve, in the sense 
that, conditionally on the overall, common information set at period t, tF , the contract 
curve for ttt bbb == 21  coincides with 'OO . The authority, if he knows all output results 
of both agent’s private information, as well as the form of their utility functions, as defined 
in (2.5), then would get the same line 'OO , as an “objective” contract curve. In addition, as 
an extreme case, we get the same line as a “true (real)” contract curve, on the condition that 
jtt == 21 bb , where the true value of M is M=j (j=1,0). Furthermore, this contract curve is 
exactly the same as the set of all possible initial endowment allocations, which satisfy (2.12). 
We define this set as pX (i.e., 'OO ), that is: 
{ }0.1'0.1)),'0.1,'0.1(),'0.1,'0.1((),(:),( 2121 ££---++=º sssssxxxxX ppppp  (2.13)  
 
3. Some simple settings  
Now we consider a model of the equilibrium transition over three periods. That is, 
t=0, 1, and 2. See Figure 2. For convenience and without the loss of generality, we normalize 
the price of the riskless asset (commodity 1) at 1 for any period. That is, 1211101 === qqq . 
At period 0, we assume that the initial endowment allocation, ),( 0,20,10, iii xxx = , is given by 
(2.12) (that is, 0,ix  is located on pX  (i.e., 'OO )), and also assume that the allocation-price 
pair, ),( 00 qx , is already in a Walrasian equilibrium. From the setting at section 2, we 
again assume }{02010 f=F=F=F . At the beginning of period 1, taking her initial 
endowment (bundle) vector, ),( 0,20,10, iii xxx = , her initial (prior) prediction, )(0 ab =i , and 
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the initial price vector, ),( 02010 qqq = , as given3-1, each agent i judges whether she should 
produce a private information if she has an inner function for it, and if she does judge she 
should, then she does produce it, and change her next (posterior) prediction, i1b , according 
to the output of iD  through the Bayesian inference. We call a series of the equilibrium 
process, which begins by producing a private information, a “speculation”, as defined more 
rigorously in section 4. At this period 1, we assume that agent i cannot observe the other 
agent’s (-i) private information, iD- , but can only make use of her own private information, 
iD , if produced. For example, if )( lDi =  is produced, then }{1 lDii ==F , but if not, then 
}{1 f=F i , respectively for i=1,2. Therefore, period 1 is considered to be the period, when 
each agent behaves herself as a Walrasian competitor, based on her private new information 
set, i1F , which would contain only her private information, iD , if produced. Thus, the next 
equilibrium allocation-price pair, ),( 11 qx , is determined at the end of period 1. At period 1, 
after a private information is produced by some agent, the equilibrium breaks. And, under 
the situation that the produced information is not disclosed to any other agents, namely, 
that the deviation (the asymmetry) of information (predictions) exists (i.e., 2111 bb ¹ ), a new 
equilibrium is reached. Therefore, we may be able to examine the first round impact of 
speculation by means of analyzing the influence on the welfare at this period. 
Thus, at this period, we set the following 2 cases:   
Case (A) 
Agent 1 has an inner information production function, which is represented by the 
performance vector, ),( 1011 PP  as of (2.6), but agent 2 does not have it. 
 
In this case, we might be able to say that the economic system is in the informational 
asymmetry, where agent 1 is information-superior and agent 2 is information-inferior. 
Case (B) 
Both of the 2 agents do have respectively an identical inner information production function, 
which is represented by the performance vectors, ),( 01 ii PP  for i=1,2 as of (2.6), where 
                                                   
3-1 From the assumption, we have 101 =q . From the F.O.C. for the equilibrium (See Appendix 1), 
assuming that 0,ix  is located on pX , necessarily we have 1021202 /))1(( ggaag -+=q .  
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01
2
0
2
1
1
0
1
1 1)1()1( PPPPPP -ºº-==-= , say. 
 
Although, in Case (B), the economic system is in the informational symmetry, the output of 
the private information produced by each agent may be distinct with some positive 
probability, so that each agent’s resulting prediction may be different, that is, it may be the 
case that 2111 bb ¹ . In this sense, the asymmetry of information may still exist 
probabilistically in both cases of (A) and (B). 
As a next stage, it may seem to us very natural to consider some processes, in 
which, after period 1, the produced information spills over to other agents, or the true value 
of the state of the world, m, is exogenously revealed into public, so that each agent comes to 
hold an identical prediction. Hence, period 2 may be considered to be the period of “the 
adjustment process” of information. We consider the following 2 cases at this period. 
Case (I) 
All of the private information, which has been produced at period 1, is entirely disclosed to 
the other agents, and at period 2 the two agents share the same information set. That is, 
2
2
2
1
2 F=F=F . For example, if )( 11 lD =  and )( 22 lD =  are produced at period 1, then 
},{ 221122212 lDlD ===F=F=F . For another example, if )( 11 lD =  is produced and 
2D  is not at period 1, then we have }{ 1122212 lD ==F=F=F . 
Case (II) 
The real value of the state of the world, M=j, is exogenously revealed to both two agents at 
period 2. That is: 
jMobMob =F=º=F=º ))|1(Pr())|1(Pr( 22221212 bb , 
 where }{22212 jM ==F=F=F , if M=j (j=0,1). 
 
Thus, in period 2, we may be able to examine the second impact of speculation. 
For the welfare analysis, we consider the following criteria. 
(U) Ex-ante Pareto improved? Efficient (optimal)? 
In terms of the ex-ante expected utility, based on the initial (ex-ante) overall information set, 
0F , do the overall possible equilibria allocations in possible equilibria paths attain the 
Pareto improvement (compared with the initial equilibrium at period 0), or the Pareto 
optimum? 
(V) Ex-ante (expected) social welfare improved? Maximized? 
Based on the initial (ex-ante) overall information set, 0F , is the ex-ante expected social 
welfare improved (compared with the initial equilibrium at period 0), or maximized? We 
adopt the following function as an ex-ante (expected) social welfare; 
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[ ] [ ]0,2220,1110 |)(*|)(*)|( F+F=F ttt xUExUExW dd  for t=1,2   (3.1) 
where the allocation, ),( ,2,1 ttt xxx = , may (or may not) be stochastic variables under 
0F .3-2  
(W) Ex-post Pareto efficient (optimal)? 
For the equilibrium path which may have actually happened, is the actually realized 
equilibrium allocation Pareto optimal, under the ex-post (actually realized) overall 
information set, 1F  or 2F ? 
(X) True state-based Pareto improved? Efficient (optimal)? 
For each state of the world, M=j (j=1,0), which might be finally revealed to be true, that is, 
under the overall “true” information set, }{ jM =ºF , as }{2 jM =ºF of case (II) at 
period 2, do the overall possible equilibria allocations in all possible equilibria paths attain 
the Pareto optimum? 
(Y) First best Pareto efficient (optimal)? 
For the true state of the world, M=j (j=1,0), is the actually realized equilibrium allocation, 
Pareto optimal under the “true” information set, }{ jM =ºF ? 
(Z) Second best (constrained) Pareto efficient (optimal)? 
Can the authority, who knows the form of each agent’s utility functions (i.e., (2.5)), but does 
not care about anything else including their information sets, or their predictions, sit 'F  or 
equivalently their predictions, sit 'b , attain, by mandatory intervention, the Pareto 
improved allocation rather than the actually realized equilibrium allocation, whatever the 
actual state of the world, M=j, is? 
 
In the ex-ante sense, we need to consider two criteria, (U) and (V), because the ex-ante 
Pareto optimum does not necessarily imply the ex-ante social welfare optimum, while the 
ex-ante social welfare optimum does imply the ex-ante Pareto optimum. Furthermore, the 
                                                   
3-2 We have two settings regarding id ’s as follows. 
1. We set the weight of each agent equally at 5.021 == dd . 
2. Another possible setting may be to choose id  such that )/( 12111 --- += llld ii , where il  is 
agent i's marginal expected utility of initial income at the initial period 0. For example, assume 
that the initial equilibrium (and also endowment) allocation is given by (2.12). Then, by simple 
calculation, we easily get ))1()1/(()1(1 aaa sss ++--=d  and 
))1()1/(()1(2 aaa sss ++-+=d .  
 14 
ex-ante social welfare improved does not imply the ex-ante Pareto improved, while the 
ex-ante Pareto improved does necessarily imply the ex-ante social welfare improved. The 
welfare analysis and some problems in the decision making theory will be discussed in 
section 5 and 6.  
 
4. Decision making mechanism for speculation 
Now we would dare to repeat that a Walrasian competitor takes her last 
equilibrium bundle, 1, -tix , as an endowment, and her current prediction, itb , and the 
current price vector, q  (not necessarily the equilibrium price, 1-tq  or tq ), as given, and 
furthermore, does not care about the other agents’ prediction, it-b  (or it--1b ). Then, we 
define the speculation as an economic behavior, in which some agent produces a private 
information through her information production function, declares distinct bundles, 
respectively, depending on the distinct outputs of the produced private information, lDi = . 
See Figure 3. We denote agent i's bundle pair for speculation by 
( ))0(),1()( ==º iisiisiis DxDxDx , where )( lDx iis =  is a 1x2 vector for 1,0=l . In most 
cases, we simply denote )( iis Dx  by isx , as long as there cannot be any confusion. The 
bundle pair for speculation, isx , is a 1x4 vector, which designates a desired bundle for each 
output result, lDi = . 
Definition 1: Given the last endowment (and equilibrium) bundle, 1, -tix , the last prediction, 
i
t 1-b  (or equivalently, the last information set, it 1-F ), and the last equilibrium price, 1-tq , 
the feasible bundle pair for rational speculation of agent i, 
( ))0(),1()( ,,, ==º itisitisitis DxDxDx  at period t, is such that; 
(1) [ ] [ ] iititisiittii CDxUExUE -F£F --- 1,11, |))((|)(  (Rationality constraint) 
(2) 1,1,1 )( --- ×£=× tititist xqlDxq  respectively for l=1,0  
(Feasibility constraint)  (4.1) 
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where iD  is a stochastic binary variable under the last information set, it 1-F , which has a 
property (2.6).  
 
For some calculation see Appendix 2. Also, for some notations and explanations regarding 
the preference of the bundles for speculation, see Appendix 3. That is, the economic agent 
decides to take a plunge into speculation, if and only if a bundle pair for speculation 
respectively satisfies the budget constraint, given the last equilibrium price, and the 
(ex-ante) expected utility attained by the bundle pair for speculation is greater than or equal 
to that attained by keeping the last endowment bundle. Now we claim the following two 
propositions. 
Proposition 1: Assume a bundle pair for speculation at period t, which is defined by: 
( ) ( ))),0(~,(),),1(~,()0(~),1(~~ 11,11,,,, ---- ==º==º tiittiiDtiittiiDitisitistis qDxxqDxxDxDxx bb
                                              (4.2) 
Then, taking the last equilibrium price, 1-tq  as given, tisx ,~ attains the best ex-ante 
expected utility under the last information set, it 1-F , among the set of all feasible bundle 
pair for speculation at period t. 
(Proof) Proof is straightforward. The bundle, )),(~,( 11, -- = tiittiiD qlDxx b , is feasible and 
attains the best ex-post expected utility respectively with the occurrence of lDi =  (l=1,0), 
based on the posterior prediction, )(~ lDiit =b  (See (2.7)), through the Bayesian inference. 
Therefore, the overall ex-ante expected utility4-1, which can be obtained by summing up each 
ex-post expected utility attained by holding )),(~,( 11, -- = tiittiiD qlDxx b  multiplied by the 
realization probability that lDi =  occurs (i.e., )|(Pr 1iti lDob -F= ), is also maximized. 
(Q.E.D.) 
Proposition 2: Assume that the cost of producing a private information is zero, i.e., 0=iC . 
Also assume that the last prediction, it 1-b , is not 0 or 1, i.e., 10 1 << -itb . Then, the best 
feasible bundle pair for speculation at period t, 
                                                   
4-1 See (A2.2) of Appendix 2 for the rigorous calculation, 
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( ) ( ))),0(~,(),),1(~,()0(~),1(~~ 11,11,,,, ---- ==º==º tiittiiDtiittiiDitisitistis qDxxqDxxDxDxx bb , 
(4.2), is always rational for all )1( 01 ii PP -= . Furthermore, the expected utility attained by 
holding tisx ,~ , is increasing with 5.0)1( 01 ³-= ii PP , and equal to that attained by holding 
the endowment (last) bundle4-2, 1, -tix , at 5.0)1( 01 =-= ii PP .  
(Proof) We just sketch the steps for proof. 
(1) Define the same indirect utility function as (2.9), but with any arbitrary  
b , not with the last prediction, it 1-b , and with the last equilibrium price, 1-tq , not with 
any arbitrary price, q :  
{ })()1()()(max),,( 20221211),(11, 21 xuxuxuqxv iiixxxttii bbb -++= =--   
s.t 1,11 --- ×£ titt xqxq    (4.3) 
Then, since the budget constraint does not include b , ),,( 11, -- ttii qxv b  is increasing and 
convex with b . 
(2) From (2.7), we have:  
)0(~*)|0(Pr)1(~*)|1(Pr 111 =F=+=F== --- iititiiititiit DDobDDob bbb  (4.4) 
And, )1(~ =iit Db  is increasing with )1( 01 ii PP -= , and is equal to it 1-b  at 
5.0)1( 01 =-= ii PP . 
(3) The overall (ex-ante) expected utility attained by holding tisx ,~ , is: 
)),0(~,(*)|0(Pr)),1(~,(*)|1(Pr 11,111,1 ------ =F=+=F= tiittiiititiittiiiti qDxvDobqDxvDob bb
            (4.5) 
                                                   
4-2 Actually, in terms of the (ex-ante) expected utility, we are indifferent between holding 1, -tix  
without speculation, and holding it regardless of the result of a private information, iD , which has 
been produced by speculation. This is clear from (4.4), (A2.1) and (A2.2). 
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Therefore, from (1) and (2), this is increasing with 5.0)1( 01 ³-= ii PP , and equal to the 
expected utility attained by holding 1, -tix  at 5.0)1( 01 =-= ii PP . (Q.E.D.) 
Proposition 1 and 2 just say that, assuming the zero cost of producing a private 
information and the unchanged price vector ( 1-tq , in this case), the information is always 
worth producing and the economic value of information is increasing with the performance 
of information, 5.0)1( 01 ³-= ii PP . This is an intuitively plausible conclusion. In other 
words, assuming the zero cost of producing a private information in the Walrasian 
equilibrium process, each agent always has a “rational” incentive to produce the information, 
and to declare the “best” feasible bundle pair for speculation.   
After the speculation has been made (i.e., after the agent has produced a private 
information), agent i's prediction changes from it 1-b  to )(~ lDiit =b , and the price vector, 
q , may be expected to begin to move from the last equilibrium price, 1-tq , because the 
market may not clear anymore. So we assume that the agent would demand the bundle, 
)),(~,( 1, qlDxx iittiiD =- b , as a Bayesian competitor, in the sense that this bundle exactly 
maximizes the agent’s (ex-post) expected utility, given the newly revised Bayesian prediction 
of the agents, )(~ lDiit =b , and the current price, q  (not 1-tq ). We will review carefully 
this process in the next section. 
 
5. The effect of speculation under the Walrasian competition 
In the course of speculation, it might be rather hard for us to expect that the 
current price, q , remains unchanged from 1-tq , until a next new equilibrium is reached. So, 
it is another problem if the new equilibrium allocation at period t, ),( ,2,1 ttt xxx = , would 
lead to be Pareto-improved as a result of speculation, compared with the last equilibrium 
allocation, ),( 1,21,11 --- = ttt xxx . Therefore, in this section, we analyze the effect of 
speculation on the economy under the framework of the Walrasian competition, assuming 
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that each agent is always a rational speculator as well as being a Bayesian competitor.5-1   
Consider Case (A) at period 1 in the three periods settings as described in section 3, where 
only agent 1 has an information production function in asymmetry. From the definition of 
the Walrasian equilibrium, (2.10), we have the following conditions at period 1:5-2 
 (1) ))(),(~,()( 11111110,1111,1 lDqlDxxlDx D ===== bb   
     ))(),(,()( 1120210,2211,2 lDqxxlDx D ===== abb  
(Competitive equilibrium condition) 
 (2) 0,20,111,211,1 )()( xxlDxlDx +==+=  (Market clearing condition)  
       (5.1)   
Since the equilibrium allocation at period 1 depends on the output of lD =1 , we denote it 
by ))(),(()( 11,211,111 lDxlDxlDx ==== . 
Figure 4(a) shows the equilibrium transition of Case (A) from period 0 to period 1, 
as a result of speculation. Point A  is the equilibrium at period 0, which represents the 
allocation, ),( 0,20,10 xxx = . A  is located on 'OO , which is the “true” Pareto set, pX , 
because 5.00201 === abb . If agent 1 produces the private information, 11 =D , then, at 
period 1, the equilibrium shifts to point B , which represents the new allocation with the 
occurrence of 11 =D , that is, ))1(),1(()1( 11,211,111 ==== DxDxDx . On the other hand, 
if agent 1 produces the private information, 01 =D , then, at period 1, the equilibrium 
shifts to C , which represents the new allocation with the occurrence of 01 =D , that is, 
))0(),0(()0( 11,211,111 ==== DxDxDx . Clearly, B  must be located in the core area, 
which is surrounded by agent 1’s indifference curve, )1(~ 11111 == Dbb , based on her posterior 
prediction, )1(~ 111 =Db , and by that of agent 2, )(2021 abb == , based on her prior prediction, 
                                                   
5-1 As a matter of course, if she does not incorporate the information production function, or 
equivalently does incorporate it, whose performance, however, is 5.01 01 =-= ii PP , she cannot 
exercise speculation. Even if she does, she would declare the same bundle (pair) for speculation, 
irrespective of the output of information, iD , as the previous bundle. 
5-2 (5.1) is the F.O.C. equilibrium conditions for Case (A), or equivalently for case (a)(i) as defined in 
(6.1) of section 6. The conditions for other 5 cases in (6.1) are described in Appendix 4.   
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)(2021 abb == . Similarly, C  must be located in the core area, which is surrounded by 
agent 1’s indifference curve, )0(~ 11111 == Dbb , based on her posterior prediction, )0(
~
1
1
1 =Db , 
and by that of agent 2, )(2021 abb == , based on her prior prediction, )(2021 abb == . 
Figure 4(b) shows the equilibrium transition of Case (B) from period 0 to period 1, 
as a result of speculation. If 11 =D  and 12 =D , or if 01 =D  and 02 =D , then the new 
equilibrium allocation at period 1 will remain the same as A , which represents the 
allocation, ),( 0,20,10 xxx = , because )(~ 11111 lD == bb  and )(~ 22121 lD == bb , where 
1,0=l , therefore 2111 bb = , assuming 2111 PP = . As shown in Figure 4(b), the equilibrium 
allocation at period 1 will shift from point A , only if 11 =D  and 02 =D , or if 01 =D  
and 12 =D . If 11 =D  and 02 =D , then the equilibrium point shifts at period 1 to point 
D, which represents the new allocation, 
))0,1(),0,1(()0,1( 211,2211,1211 ======= DDxDDxDDx . D  must be located in the 
core area, which is surrounded by agent 1’s indifference curve, )1(~ 11111 == Dbb , based on her 
posterior prediction, )1(~ 111 =Db , and by that of agent 2, )0(~ 22121 == Dbb , based on her 
posterior prediction, )0(~ 221 =Db . Similarly, if 01 =D  and 12 =D , then the equilibrium 
point shifts at period 1 to point E , which represents the new allocation; 
))1,0(),1,0(()1,0( 211,2211,1211 ======= DDxDDxDDx . E  must be located in the 
core area, which is surrounded by agent 1’s indifference curve, )0(~ 11111 == Dbb , based on her 
posterior prediction, )0(~ 111 =Db , and by that of agent 2, )1(~ 22121 == Dbb , based on her 
posterior prediction, )1(~ 221 =Db .5-3 5-4 
                                                   
5-3 Note that we assume that, at period 1, the output information produced by an agent is not disclosed 
to the other agent 
5-4 We denote the bundle allocated to agent i (i=1,2) at the allocation points, A , B , C , E ,… of the 
Figures, by iA , iB , iC ,…. Using these notations, clearly, 0,ii xA = , )1( 11, == DxB ii , 
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For Case (A) at period 1, we claim the following proposition 
Proposition 3: (i) Assume Case (A) at period 1. Also, assume that 01 =C , and 
}{02010 f=F=F=F . Then, as a result of speculation caused by agent 1, that is, agent 1's 
producing a private information, 1D , agent 1 becomes better off in the ex-ante sense that: 
[ ] [ ] )(|))((|)( 11011,11100,11 CDxUExUE -F£F    
or, equivalently )( 11,10,1 110 Dxx
D
b    (5.2) 
Also, agent 2 becomes worse off in the ex-ante sense that; 
 [ ] [ ]2011,22200,22 |))((|)( F>F DxUExUE     
or, equivalently 0,211,2 120)( xDx
D
b ,    (5.3) 
where 1D  is a stochastic binary variable under the information set, )( 20100 F=F=F , 
which has a property, (2.6). 
(ii) In addition to the assumption at (i), also assume that each agent has an identical form of 
utility functions given by (2.5). Then, the R.H.S. of (5.2) is increasing with regard to 
)1( 1011 PP -= , and the R.H.S. of (5.2) is decreasing with regard to )1( 1011 PP -= . In other 
words, as a result of speculation caused by agent 1, the higher )1( 1011 PP -=  will lead to the 
higher expected utility for agent 1 and the lower expected utility for agent 2. 
(Proof) (i) See Figure 4 (a). Point A  denotes the equilibrium allocation at period 0, that is, 
),( 0,20,1 xxx o = . Point B  denotes the equilibrium allocation at period 1 with the 
occurrence of 11 =D , that is; 
  ))1(),1(()1(: 11,211,111 ==== DxDxDxB . 
B  must be located in the core area which is surrounded by agent 1’s (posterior) indifference 
                                                                                                                                                     
)0( 11, == DxC ii , )1,0( 211, === DDxE ii , and so on. Also, in order to indicate the allocation 
at each point, for simplicity, we sometimes use the expression like, 0xA = , )1( 11 == DxB , 
)0( 11 == DxC , )1,0( 211 === DDxE , and so on, although A , B , C , E ,… are, precisely 
speaking, geographical points and not the allocations themselves. 
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curve, )1(~ 11111 == Dbb , and agent 2’s last (prior) indifference curve, 20b . It means that: 
[ ] [ ]}1{|))1((}1{,|)( 11011,111100,11 =F=£=F DDxUEDxUE , or equivalently, 
)1( 11,1)1(~0,1 11111 === Dxx Dbb     (A) 
On the other hand, although agent 2’s prediction at period 1 remains the same as that at 
period 0, that is, 2021 bb = , her “objective” indifference curve shifts to )1(~ 111 =Db  from 20b  
with the occurrence of 11 =D  at period 1. Since at period 1, agent 2’s “objective” 
indifference curve, )1(~ 111 =Db , is tangent with agent 1’s indifference curve, )1(~ 11111 == Dbb , B  
must be located inside A , viewing from 'O , the original point of agent 2, with respect to 
)1(~ 111 =Db . Therefore, we have:  
[ ] [ ]}1{|))1((}1{,|)( 12011,221200,22 =F=³=F DDxUEDxUE , or equivalently, 
0,2
)1(~1
1,2
1
1
1
)1( xDx D == b    (B) 
Quite similarly, let point C  denotes the equilibrium allocation at period 1 with the 
occurrence of 01 =D . Then ))0(),0(()0(: 11,211,111 ==== DxDxDxC . From the 
analogy of the above argument, we have: 
[ ] [ ]}0{|))0((}0{,|)( 11011,111100,11 =F=£=F DDxUEDxUE , or equivalently, 
)0( 11,1)0(~0,1 11111 === Dxx Dbb   (C) 
[ ] [ ]}0{|))0((}0{,|)( 12011,221200,22 =F=³=F DDxUEDxUE , or equivalently, 
0,2
)0(~1
1,2
1
1
1
)0( xDx D == b    (D) 
From the calculation of Appendix 2 with the results (A), (B), (C) and (D), we get (5.2) and 
(5.3).  
(ii) Abbreviated. (Q.E.D.) 
With the last equilibrium price, 0q , the bundle pair for speculation; 
 22 
( ) ( ))),0(~,(),),1(~,()0(~),1(~~ 0110,110110,111,11,11,1 qDxxqDxxDxDxx tDtDisiss ==º==º bb , is 
the best, among being feasible and rational for agent 1. See Proposition 1 and 2. Therefore, 
agent 1 would take a plunge into speculation, and produce a private information. But, 
afterwards, because of the break of the market clearing condition caused by the change of 
agent 1’s prediction (to the posterior prediction, )(~ 111 lD =b ), the current price vector, q , 
begins to move and reach the new equilibrium price, 1q . Proposition 3 says that, even under 
the new price, 1q , agent 1, an information superior, and at the same time a positive 
speculator, would be better off, while agent 2, an information inferior, and a passive 
speculation taker, would be worse off. Now, we set some parameters at 1.0=a , 0.11 =g , 
5.112 =g , 5.002 =g . Define the ex-ante (expected) welfare ratios of agent 1, 2 and the 
society, 1R , 2R , and SR , as the ratios of the ex-ante overall expected utility, of the 
“after-speculation” equilibria allocations to that of the “before-speculation”. These ratios are, 
of course, measured at the initial period 0. See Appendix 5 for the strict definition. Also, set 
0=s , so that the initial endowment bundle of each agent may be the same. Then, Figure 
5(a) shows the ex-ante welfare ratios, 1R , 2R , and SR , as a function of )1( 1011 PP -= , 
which well illustrates the result of Proposition 3. 
The interesting case arises, when agent 1 behaves herself according to a “rational”, 
but different rule from as a Bayesian competitor. Let us think about the following case. 
When, at the beginning of period 1, agent 1 produces the private information, lD =1  
(l=0,1), then the agent would hold in mind that the state of the world, m, is exactly l . In 
other words, her new prediction would be, lD == 111b , instead of )(~ 11111 lD == bb , and 
her bundle pair for speculation would be: 
( ) ( )),0,(),,1,()0(ˆ),1(ˆˆ 0110,110110,1111,111,11,1 qxxqxxDxDxx DDsss ==º==º bb  (5.4) 
Furthermore, we assume that, after the price begins to move from 0q , her demand would 
be, given any arbitrary price, q , ),,( 0,11 qlxxD  if lD =1 , while agent 2 would demand 
),,( 0,22 qxxD a , using her previous prediction, ab =20 . This rule of agent 1 is, in a sense, 
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based on the misperception or the possession that “ the real value of the state of the world, 
M, must be l ”, while, from the viewpoint of the Bayesian inference, her prediction should be 
exactly )(~ 111 lD =b . However, the bundle pair for speculation, 1,1ˆ sx , (5.4), might be still 
feasible and rational, in the sense of Definition 1. See Figure 5 (b) for this case, with the 
contrast to Figure 5(a). In the region where )1( 1011 PP -=  is smaller than 0.64, 1,1ˆ sx  is not 
rational (feasible, though) for agent 1, so she does not exercise speculation (or does not 
produce a private information). Therefore, the equilibrium allocation at period 1, 1x , 
remains the same as the last allocation, 0x , and therefore all the ex-ante welfare ratios, 1R , 
2R , and SR  are 1’s. On the other hand, in the region where 11P  is greater than 0.64, 1,1ˆ sx  
becomes rational, then agent 1 exercises speculation. However, it is noteworthy that, at 
1
1P =0.64-0.80, agent 1 herself becomes worse off as well as agent 2, as a result of speculation. 
Agent 1 becomes better off only in the region where 11P  is greater than 0.80. This is a 
totally different point from Figure 5(a)5-5, where agent 1 behaves herself as a Bayesian 
competitor, based on the correctly revised posterior prediction, )(~ 111 lD =b . This may be 
considered to be a “rational” overreaction, which should have increased her ex-ante expected 
utility, given the last equilibrium price, 0q , but eventually decreased it as a result of the 
price adjustment through the new equilibrium process. Figure 4(c) illustrates this 
equilibrium transition from period 0 to period 1, as a result of speculation.5-6 If agent 1 
produces the private information, 11 =D , then, at period 1, the equilibrium shifts to point 
F , which represents the new allocation with the occurrence of 11 =D , that is, 
))1(ˆ),1(ˆ()1(ˆ 11,211,111 ==== DxDxDx . On the other hand, if agent 1 produces the private 
information, 01 =D , then, at period 1, the equilibrium shifts to G , which represents the 
new allocation with the occurrence of 01 =D , that is, 
))0(ˆ),0(ˆ()0(ˆ 11,211,111 ==== DxDxDx . Clearly, F  must be located in the core area, 
                                                   
5-5 A similar point is that agent 1’s welfare ratio, 1R , is increasing and agent 2’s welfare ratio, 2R , is 
decreasing with 11P . But both hold only at 64.011 >P .  
5-6 For the equilibrium F.O.C. conditions of this “rational overreaction” setting, see (A4.1) in Appendix 
4. 
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which is surrounded by agent 1’s indifference curve, 111 =b , based on her “possessed” 
prediction, 111 =b , and by that of agent 2, )(2021 abb == , based on her prior prediction, 
)(20 ab = . Similarly, G  must be located in the core area, which is surrounded by agent 1’s 
indifference curve, 011 =b , based on her “possessed” prediction, 011 =b , and that of agent 2, 
)(2021 abb == , based on her prior prediction, )(20 ab = . Note, however, that, as in the figure 
(actually, for 64.0)5.0( 11 ££ P ), F  might be located outside the core area, which is 
surrounded by agent 1’s “objective” indifference curve, )1(~ 111 =Db , based on her posterior 
Bayesian prediction, )1(~ 111 =Db , and by that of agent 2, )(2021 abb == , based on her prior 
prediction, )(20 ab = . Similarly, G  might be located outside the core area, which is 
surrounded by agent 1’s “objective” indifference curve based on her posterior Bayesian 
prediction, )0(~ 111 =Db , and that of agent 2 based on her prior prediction, )(20 ab = . In this 
case5-7, we have for agent 1: 
1
)1(~
1
1
1
1
AF D =b  and 1)0(~1 111 AG D =b     (5.5) 
Now consider agent 2. With the occurrence of 11 =D , the “objective” indifference curve of 
agent 2 at period 1 would be )1(~ 11121 == Dbb , which is tangent with agent 1’s “objective” 
indifference curve, )1(~ 11111 == Dbb . Similarly, with the occurrence of 01 =D , the “objective” 
indifference curve of agent 2 at period 1 would be )0(~ 11121 == Dbb , which is tangent with agent 
1’s “objective” indifference curve, )0(~ 11111 == Dbb .  So, assuming that, as in Figure 4(c), F  
and G  are located inside A , viewing from 'O , respectively with regard to )1(~ 11121 == Dbb  
                                                   
5-7 Of course, )1(ˆ 11, == DxF ii , )0(ˆ 11, == DxG ii , 0,ii xA =  for i=1,2. 
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and )0(~ 11111 == Dbb . Then we have for agent 2:  
2
)1(~
2
1
1
1
2
1
AF D ==bb  and 2)0(~2 11121 AG D ==bb    (5.6) 
Therefore, from (5.5) and (5.6), defining the bundle pairs for speculation; 
),())0(ˆ),1(ˆ()(ˆ 11,11,11, iiiii GFDxDxDx ====  and 
),()ˆ,ˆ()(ˆ 0,0,10, iiiii AAxxDx == ,    (5.7) 
then we get:   
0,1
1
1,1 ˆ)(ˆ 11
0
xDx Db  and 
1,2
1
1,2 ˆ)(ˆ 12
0
xDx Db    (5.8) 
Therefore, we can conclude that both agents might be worse off in terms of the ex-ante 
expected utility on account of the “rational” speculation caused by agent 1 for a 
comparatively lower )1( 1011 PP -= . 
 
6. The welfare analysis and some problem in the decision making theory 
Now we proceed to the welfare analysis, as in section 5, exactly on the basis of the 
three period settings described in section 3. In Figure 66-1, we show the ex-ante welfare 
ratios, 1R , 2R , and SR , as functions of s , which represents the ratio of the economic 
value of agent 1’s initial endowment to agent 2’s, by )1/()1( ss +- 6-2, where 11 ££- s . 
The cases we consider are following. 
(a)(i): Case (A) at period 1. (The first round effect) 
(a)(ii): Case (A) at period 1, and Case (I) at period 2. (The first plus second round effect) 
(a)(iii): Case (A) at period 1, and Case (II) at period 2. (The first plus second round effect) 
(b)(i): Case (B) at period 1. (The first round effect) 
(b)(ii): Case (B) at period 1, and Case (I) at period 2. (The first plus second round effect) 
(b)(iii): Case (B) at period 1, and Case (II) at period 2. (The first plus second round effect) 
        (6.1) 
Three cases of Figure 6(a) represent (a)(i), (a)(ii) and (a)(iii) adopting Case (A) at period 1 
respectively, and therefore the economic system is in the informational asymmetry. Main 
                                                   
6-1 As in Figure 5, we set parameters at 1.0=a , 0.11 =g , 5.112 =g , 5.002 =g . We also set the 
weight of each agent equally at 5.021 == dd , for the ex-ante social welfare ratio, SR . 
6-2 As s increases, the ratio of agent 1’s initial economic value to agent 2’s, )1/()1( ss +- , decreases. 
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features are following. 6-3 
F1. Through (i), (ii) and (iii), 1R  is increasing with respect to s , that is, decreasing with 
)1/()1( ss +- , the ratio of the economic value of agent 1’s initial endowment to agent 2’s, 
and 1R  is always greater than 1. 2R  is not necessarily monotone with s, but always less 
than 1. 
F2. In (i), SR  is always less than 1. 
F3. For an arbitrarily given s , each of 1R , 2R , and SR  has the greatest value in (ii), the 
second in (iii), and the lowest in (i).  
 
Three cases of Figure 6(b) represent (b)(i), (b)(ii) and (b)(iii) adopting Case (B) at period 1 
respectively, and therefore the economic system is in the informational symmetry. Main 
features are following.6-4 
F4. In (i), SR  is always less than 1. 
F5. For an arbitrarily given s , each of 1R , 2R , and SR  has the greatest value in (ii), the 
second in (iii), and the lowest in (i).  
F6. 1R  is greater than 2R  for s<0 , and smaller than 2R  for 0<s . 
F7. Through (i), (ii) and (iii), there does not exist any s  such that both 1R  and 2R  are 
greater than 1. 
F8. In (ii) and (iii), SR  can be greater than or smaller than 1 for some s . 
 
With the above results, we claim the following important propositions, keeping the same 
assumptions as footnote 6-3 for (a)(i), (a)(ii) and (a)(iii), and as footnote 6-4 for (b)(i), (b)(ii) 
and (b)(iii), respectively. For the proofs and some explanation, see Appendix 6. 
Proposition 4: In each of all six cases of the transition processes defined in (6.1), for any s , 
the overall equilibria allocations, which might be finally attained with a positive probability 
at the last period (period 1 for (a)(i) and (b)(i), and period 2 for (a)(ii), (a)(iii), (b)(ii) and 
(b)(iii)), cannot be ex-ante Pareto improved, compared with the initial equilibrium at period 
0. 
 
This proposition arises from F1 and F7. It is noteworthy that, even taking account of the 
adjustment process of information at period 2 (that is, even in (a)(ii), (a)(iii), (b)(ii) or (b)(iii)), 
or even in the symmetric cases adopting Case (B) at period 1 (that is, even in (b)(i), (b)(ii) or 
(b)(iii)), the overall equilibria allocations cannot be the ex-ante Pareto improved, that is, at 
                                                   
6-3 We are assuming that 115.0 P< . 
6-4 We are assuming that 1)(5.0 12111 <º=< PPP . That is, both agents have the same performance 
in producing the information, and they are also fallible. 
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least one agent will be worse off in terms of the ex-ante expected utility on account of 
speculation. 
Proposition 5: In each of 4 cases of (a)(i), (a)(iii), (b)(i) and (b)(iii), the transition processes 
defined in (6.1), for any s , the overall equilibria allocations, which might be finally attained 
with a positive probability at the last period, cannot be ex-ante Pareto efficient, or can never 
be the ex-ante social welfare maximized. 
 
In Proposition 5, it remains still uncertain that, in (a)(ii) or (b)(ii), the overall equilibria 
allocations cannot be ex-ante Pareto efficient or ex-ante social welfare maximized. However, 
the results of our computation as in Figure 6 show the following fact. 
Fact 1: For any setting of parameters, a , 1g , 12g , 02g , and s , the ex-ante expected utility 
of agent i (i=1,2) attained at period 2, or equivalently the ex-ante welfare ratio, iR  (i=1,2) at 
the last period, is smaller (worse off) in either (a)(iii) or (b)(iii) than in (a)(ii) or (b)(ii), 
respectively.6-5 
 
As a special example of the symmetric cases, we have an interesting proposition as follows.  
Proposition 6: In either of (b)(i), (b)(ii) or (b)(iii) (that is, in the symmetric cases adopting 
Case (B) at period 1), set 0=s , where both agents have equally the same initial 
endowment. Then, both agents become worse off in terms of the ex-ante expected utility on 
account of speculation, in the sense that both 1R  and 2R  are less than 1. 
 
This proposition is very interesting, because it shows that the economic value of information 
can be negative in any possible definition. So far as the ex-ante social welfare improvement 
is concerned, we claim the following proposition, although we do not arrive at complete 
proofs for them. 
Proposition 7: Assume the case6-6 that 5.021 == dd . Then, in either (a)(i) or (b)(i), the 
ex-ante social welfare ratio, SR , is always less than 1 for any s . In either of (a)(ii), (a)(iii), 
                                                   
6-5 The transition of the “objective” prediction in Case (II) from period 1 to 2 is shown as the following 
formula:  
0*)|0(Pr1*)|1(Pr 111 F=+F== MobMobb  
This implies that the expectation of the true state, which is to be revealed at period 2, is just the 
current (period 1) objective prediction. This is just like a mean preserving spread transition in terms of 
prediction. So, under the concave utility, it is easily imagined that the revelation of the true state at 
period 2, compared with Case (I), may have a negative effect on each agent’s ex-ante expected utility, 
but actually, it cannot be rigorously proved as a general proposition, because each agent’s utility is 
state dependent, and in addition, the equilibria allocations at Case (II) may not be geographically 
“mean preserving”, compared with Case (I). Fact 1 shows, nevertheless, that this is true as long as our 
computation results are concerned.  
6-6 id  is the weight of each agent i in the ex-ante social welfare. See (V) of the welfare criteria in 
section 3. 
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(b)(ii) or (b)(iii) (that is, for the cases taking account of the adjustment process of information 
at period 2), SR , can be both greater than 1 or less than 1 by choosing some s .6-7 
Also assume the case that )/( 12111 --- += llld ii , where il  is agent i's marginal utility of 
initial income. Then, in either of (a)(i), (a)(ii), (a)(iii), (b)(i), (b)(ii) or (b)(iii), the ex-ante social 
welfare ratio, SR , is always less than 1 for any s .6-8  
Proposition 8: In either of (b)(i), (b)(ii) or (b)(iii) (that is, in the symmetric cases adopting 
Case (B) at period 1), the ex-ante welfare ratio, iR , of agent i who has the less initial 
endowment is greater than iR-  of the other agent –i. 
 
This proposition just restates F6. It implies that, in the symmetric cases, the “poorer” agent 
will suffer comparatively the less damage in terms of the ex-ante expected utility, than the 
“richer” agent on account of speculation. 
Next, from F3 and F5, we have: 
Proposition 9: Among (a)(i), (a)(ii) and (a)(iii) (that is, in the asymmetric cases adopting Case 
(A) at period 1), for any s , each of 1R , 2R , and SR  has the greatest value in (a)(ii), the 
second in (a)(iii), and the lowest in (a)(i). Quite similarly, among (b)(i), (b)(ii) and (b)(iii) (that 
is, in the symmetric cases adopting Case (B) at period 1), for any s , each of 1R , 2R , and 
SR  has the greatest value in (b)(ii), the second in (b)(iii), and the lowest in (b)(i).  
 
This proposition includes Fact 1. The proof of the part of the proposition, that 1R , 2R , and 
SR  has the greater value in (ii) than in (i), and the greater value in (iii) than in (i), is clear. 
See Appendix 6. 
One comment on the asymmetric cases (that is, (a)(i), (a)(ii) and (a)(iii) ). It is noteworthy 
that 2R , the ex-ante welfare ratio of the agent, who does not incorporate an information 
production function, therefore cannot exercise speculation by herself, is not necessarily 
monotonic with respect to s . For example, in Figure 6(a)(i), 2R  has the lowest value about 
at 3.0-=s . This fact does not imply the less s  (that is, the less agent 2’s initial 
endowment), the greater damage in welfare for the agent. Specifically, we can regard that 
the point 3.0-=s , where agent 2’s initial endowment is, in proportion, 7.01 =+ s , while 
that of agent 1 is 3.11 =- s , is the “resonance” point, at which agent 2 suffers the greatest 
damage in welfare (in terms of the ex-ante expected utility), on account of the speculation 
caused by agent 1. 
                                                   
6-7 Our computation results show this part (the first paragraph) of Proposition 7. 
6-8 This part (the second paragraph) of Proposition 7 can be proved immediately from Lemma 1 as 
described in Appendix 6. 
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The results we explained so far are regarding the welfare criteria, (U) and (V)6-9, as 
defined in section 3. As well as all other criteria ((W), (X), (Y) and (Z)), we summarize all of 
these results in Table. We will not offer all the proofs of these results, because they are 
almost clear from the previous arguments. So, we just stay at indicating some interesting 
points. At first, as to the ex-post Pareto optimality (criterion (W)), it is always achieved at 
period 2, after the adjustment process of information (i.e., in (a)(ii), (a)(iii), (b)(ii) or (b)(iii)), 
simply because both agents come to share the same prediction, 2212 bb = . As for the 
true-state basis, (X), neither the Pareto improvement nor the Pareto optimum can be 
achieved, assuming that the multiple equilibria paths and allocations caused by speculation 
probabilistically exist. The impossibility of the Pareto improvement is also easily derived, 
using Lemma 1. That of the Pareto optimum can be proved immediately from considering 
the unique true state-based utility functions and their concavity, respectively for both agents. 
The results of the first best Pareto optimality, (Y), can be obtained from the same logic as the 
ex-post Pareto optimality, (W). The concept of the second best Pareto optimality is useful 
only at period 1, because at period 2, after the adjustment process of information, the first 
best Pareto optimum is automatically achieved. See Figure 7 for the case (a)(i) at period 1. 
Assume that agent 1 produces 11 =D , and the equilibrium allocation shifts to B  at period 
1. The shaded area, which is the intersect of the core area for 1=M  and for 0=M , is 
exactly the set of the second best Pareto improving allocations, in the sense that every 
element in this shaded area is Pareto improving regardless of the value of M . On the 
contrary, if the intersect of these two core areas is empty (that is, these two core areas do not 
intersect.), then we can conclude that there exists no second best Pareto improving 
allocation. 
Through this paper, we have been assuming the utility functions with very general 
assumptions as in from (2.1) to (2.4), where each agent has equally the same risk preference 
for the holding of each commodity with aCRRA = . Now we would like to focus on the role 
of the riskless commodity (commodity 1), which is normally considered to be “money”. Let us 
consider the following quasi-linear utility function: 
)()( ,22,11, tijititii xuxxU += g  if M=j (j=1,0)   (6.2) 
Here we assume that the slope of the linear part of utility for commodity 1, 1g  say, is 
                                                   
6-9 As for the relations between (U) and (V), we just write down the useful relationships, which can be 
easily derived from the conventional welfare economics theories. 
1. Ex-ante social welfare maximum Þ  Ex-ante Pareto optimum 
2. NOT Ex-ante Pareto optimum Þ  NOT Ex-ante social welfare maximum 
3. Ex-ante Pareto improved Þ  Ex-ante social welfare improved  
4. NOT Ex-ante social welfare improved Þ  NOT Ex-ante Pareto improved 
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constant over agents. 
With similar general assumptions: 
+¥=
+®
)('lim ,220,2
tij
ix
xu
ti
, 0)0(2 =jiu , 0)('lim ,22,
2
+=
+¥®
tij
ix
xu
ti
 (6.3) 
It is convenient to assume the same form as in (2.5) in the part of )( ,22 tiji xu : 
atijtij
i xxu -= 1,22,22 )()( g  if M=j, where 00212 >> gg .  (6.4) 
The common form of these functions implies that each agent is risk neutral for the part of 
commodity 1, and risk averse for the part of commodity 2 with aCRRA = . We assume that 
all other settings are exactly the same as so far. See Figure 8(a). Note that every indifference 
curve of each agent, itijititii UxuxxU =+= )()( ,22,1, , say, shifts in parallel along the axis of 
commodity 1, that is, ''OO  or ''''OO , whatever the value of each agent’s prediction, itb , 
is. Therefore, in any cases, “subjective”, “objective” or “true (real)”, the contract curve is 
always a straight line, which is parallel to ''OO  or ''''OO . Specifically, at the initial 
period 0, assuming abb == 2010 , the subjective contract curve is shown as a line, '''RR , 
where 'R  and ''R  are the middle points of '''OO  and '''OO , respectively. Also, the 
“objective” or “true” contract curve always coincides with '''RR , because we should apply 
ttt bbb == 21  for “objective”, and )(21 jMtt === bb  for “true”. Next, see Figure 8(b) for 
Case (A). At period 1, the equilibrium allocation will shift from point A  to point B  with 
the occurrence of 11 =D , and from point A  to point C  with the occurrence of 01 =D . So, 
B  is located on the subjective contract curve, ''' 11 RR , say, corresponding to 
)1(~ 11111 == Dbb  and ab =20 , and, C  is located on the subjective contract curve, 
''' 00 RR , say, corresponding to )0(~ 11111 == Dbb  and ab =20 . At period 2, however, after 
the adjustment process of information, the predictions of both agents again coincide (i.e., 
2
2
1
2 bb = ). So the subjective contract curve comes back to the initial one, '''RR , and the 
every possible equilibrium allocation at period 2 ( B~ ,C~  or etc.) must be located on it. With 
such quasi-linear utility, agent i’s marginal expected utility of initial income is always 
1gl =i  for i=1,2, so that two settings of id ’s (the weight of each agent on the ex-ante social 
welfare) in footnote 3-2 coincide with each other at 5.021 == dd . Therefore, as easily seen, 
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the ex-ante social welfare is kept constant at every allocation points on '''RR , because each 
agent’s holding of (risky) commodity 2 is constant on '''RR , that is, 1,2 =tix  for i=1,2, and 
the utility of the part of (riskless) commodity 1 is linear and has the same slope for each 
agent. This implies that, considering the equilibrium process until at period 2 (i.e., the fist 
plus second round effect), the existence of the risk neutral commodity (1) fully insures the 
ex-ante social welfare, not each individual ex-ante utility, against speculation, in the sense 
that the ex-ante social welfare is kept invariant by means of any kind of speculation (i.e., in 
either case of (a)(ii), (a)(iii), (b)(ii) or (b)(iii)), and as a matter of course, the ex-ante Pareto 
improvement cannot be still attained. Summarizing these results together, we claim the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 10: Assume the common form of the quasi-linear utility function for each agent, 
as defined in (6.2) and (6.4). Then, in either case of (a)(ii), (a)(iii), (b)(ii) or (b)(iii), the ex-ante 
social welfare is kept invariant, but the ex-ante Pareto improvement cannot be attained.  
 
It is interesting to observe that the risk neutrality (linearity) of a riskless 
commodity completely cancels off, at period 2, the disturbance effect of speculation (a private 
information), and fully insures the ex-ante social welfare, keeping it invariant, on the other 
hand, the risk averseness (concavity) of a riskless commodity, with linear relationship 
between states and commodities, cannot completely cancel off the disturbance effect of 
speculation, and furthermore always decrease the ex-ante social welfare6-10.   
As for the first round effect at period 1 (i.e., in case (a)(i) or (b)(i)), we would like to comment 
one point. That is, it is not always assured that the equilibrium holding of (riskless) 
commodity 1 at period 1 is positive. It implies, for example in Case (A) setting, that when 
agent 1 has a far larger initial endowment than agent 2, that is, s  is close to –1, and 
furthermore when agent 1 produces 01 =D , then agent 2’s holding of commodity 1 might 
come easily close to 0 or even be negative, and therefore the cash-in-advance constraint of 
agent 2 might be easily binding or even violated. 
 
7. Final remarks 
The model of this paper is based on a simple exchange economy with no production 
function, in which two agents exchange two commodities, one risky, and one riskless, they 
have a common form of the separable, state dependent and concave utility function, and 
share an identical initial prediction. Some general assumptions like from (2.1) to (2.4) 
always assure the existence of the Walrasian equilibrium, even when speculation (i.e., the 
production of information) is in process at period 1. Furthermore, we consider some 
                                                   
6-10 We are considering the ex-ante social welfare in the second definition of footnote 3-2. 
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adjustment process at period 2, in which, after speculation, the produced information or the 
true state of the world spills over into public. In these contexts, the model considered in this 
paper is very robust against the disturbance (distorted) effect of speculation. Nevertheless, it 
is noteworthy that, assuming the linear relations between states and between commodities, 
(2.4), speculation can never attain the ex-ante Pareto improvement, whatever the economic 
system is in informational asymmetry or symmetry (i.e., in each of 6 cases defined in (6.1)). 
Furthermore, in some cases (i.e., in either of (a)(i), (a)(iii), (b)(i) or (b)(iii)), the ex-ante Pareto 
optimum cannot be achieved. 
Our definition of “information” as in (2.6), which is well known in the field of 
engineering, and which, precisely speaking, we should call an “information production 
function”7-1, might be rather controversial. For example, see (A2.5): 
 )0(~*)|0(Pr)1(~*)|1(Pr 111 =F=+=F== --- iititiiititiit DDobDDob bbb  (A2.5) 
(A2.5) just says that the expectation of the future Bayesian predictions is just the current 
prediction. In this sense, the “information” merely makes the mean preserving spread in 
terms of prediction. Furthermore, assuming 5.0=a , and ii PP 01 1-= , we have 
5.0)|1(Pr 0 =F= iiDob , which means that the information production function (not the 
information, iD ) itself is useless for predicting in advance whether 1=iD  or 0=iD . 
Then, a fundamental question arises. Even if iD , which is not still produced therefore 
unknown to public, is surely some “information” regarding the profitability of an asset or the 
productivity of production technology or etc, is iD  really helpful for our economic activity, 
for example, for innovation or invention in a production process? Can we really call it 
“information”? 
In this regard, Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1985) make the analogous formulation 
regarding the judgment (decision-making) of a project as an entire organization, but their 
implication is more profound than and nontrivially different from ours in the context of the 
organizational economics. According to them, the accumulation of each agent’s independent 
decision-making heightens the probability that the organization eventually makes a “right” 
decision7-2, which surely leads, for example, to the success of a research project or to the 
technology innovation, or equivalently to the productivity improvement, or to the cost 
reduction or etc. In these contexts, they implicitly assume “the positive endogenous 
                                                   
7-1 It is because (2.6) just describes the performance regarding the correctness or the fallibility of 
information, iD , but the information itself is not produced, therefore is not disclosed to any agents.  
7-2 A “right” decision corresponds to 1=D  for 1=M  or 0=D  for 0=M , where D  denotes 
the decision of an organization. 
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economic effect” subsequently brought by a “right” judgment, which consequently enhances 
the social welfare as well as the economic profit of the organization. This is a decisively 
important and plausible implication of the organizational economics. 
The setting of our model, however, completely ignores such a kind of positive 
endogenous effects, at least in this paper, and focuses genuinely on one aspect (role) of 
“information” as purely “predicting” the true state of the world, where the output results of 
information produced by agents do not have any subsequent and substantial economic effect 
on the adjustment of production process, on the market innovation or on the restructure of 
the underlying economic system.7-3  
In spite of these criticisms, our definition might well capture one aspect of 
speculation, in the sense that a speculator arouses a new, different, and probabilistic 
economic action using a private information, at least believing that it would increase her 
ex-ante individual expected utility even within a multi-agents-interacted economic system. 
In effect, we succeed in proving, in a simplest pure exchange economy (Edgeworth box), that 
such a belief can be economically rationalized without assuming any positive endogenous 
effect, however, that, in terms of the ex-ante welfare, the Pareto improvement cannot be 
achieved. Furthermore, at least at period 1, each speculator behaves herself on the basis of a 
private information, which is produced but not still disclosed into public, therefore, in this 
paper we may be equivalently examining the effect of the negative externality caused by a 
privately produced information mainly in terms of the ex-ante expected welfare. 
The summary of this paper is repeated as follows. In this paper, we construct the 
model on Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium transition processes over three periods, and 
on Shannon’s famous definition of “information production function”. Also we assume that 
there exist two types of assets (commodities), risky and riskless, each of two agents has an 
identical, separable and state dependent utility with the same constant relative risk 
aversion, and all of these assumptions easily enable us to make welfare analysis by 
Edgeworth box. Some quite general conditions including Inada condition always assure the 
existence of the equilibrium even when speculation is in process at period 1, and 
furthermore, we consider some adjustment process at period 2, in which, after speculation, 
                                                   
7-3 If we add, in our setting, the endogenous effect of information regarding the profitability of a risky 
commodity (2), then )( ,22 tiji xu  as defined in (2.5) may be roughly rewritten as following. 
atiljjtij
i xexu -+= 1,2,2,22 ))(()( g  if jM =  and lDi =   (7.1) 
where 00212 >> gg  and 0,0,0,0 1,00,10,01,1 ££³³ eeee .  
The clear positiveness of the endogenous effect holds for the case:  
0,0,0,0 1,00,10,01,1 ==>> eeee  
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the overall produced information or the true state of the world is revealed into public. In 
these senses, the model of this paper is very robust against the disturbance effect of 
speculation.  
Nevertheless, specifically we showed in Proposition 4, with the linear relations 
between states and commodities, that a speculation can never attain ex-ante Pareto 
improvement, if there exists no positive endogenous economic effect typically represented by 
learning-by-doing, which might be brought by a “right” judgment of an organization, and 
would presumably lead to the adjustment of production process, the market innovation, or 
the restructure of the underlying economic system. This aspect also supports the implication 
by Aoki (2006), which analyzes the effect of information sharing in a vertical market 
structure. In these contexts, we equivalently and purely examine the effect of the “negative” 
externality caused by privately produced information.  
The impossibility of Pareto improvement under these simple assumptions 
(Proposition 4) is a crucial claim newly developed by this paper, and has a quite general 
economic implication because of the generality and the simplicity of the model. Although 
Hirshleifer already states that where the economic agents are completely in symmetry in 
every aspects including the initial endowment, the utility form or the information 
production ability, an informative signal may make every agent worse off (this statement is 
equivalent with our Proposition 6, which is shown, however, in an equilibrium eventually 
attained.), our Proposition 4 always holds regardless of the informational symmetry or 
asymmetry, regardless of the proportion in each agent’ s initial endowment, or regardless of 
the high/bad performance (preciseness) of the produced information. It contains also 
somewhat a different implication from that of Stein (1987), which insists that, “in general, 
informational externalities can be either positive or negative”. Furthermore, the proof of this 
proposition explains that such welfare reducing effect of speculation arises from the 
probabilistic fallibility of each agent’s decision making, rather than from the existence of 
asymmetric information itself, even though produced information itself is quite informative. 
Through Proposition 5 to 8, we examine the same equilibrium transition from 
different angles, using various welfare criteria, like ex-ante Pareto efficiency (optimality), 
ex-ante social welfare improvement/maximization, ex-post Pareto optimality, 
true-state-based Pareto improvement/optimality, first/second best Pareto optimality, and 
shows some problem in the decision making theory that the Walrasian equilibrium 
transition, which is probabilistically multiple in paths on account of stochastic nature of 
produced information, may not necessarily promise the increase or the optimality in welfare 
also from these criteria.  
In addition, Proposition 10 analyzes some decisive role of a riskless asset (money) on 
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the ex-ante expected social welfare, in which its risk averse utility form always cause it 
decrease in speculation, on the other hand, the risk neutral (linear) form always keeps it 
invariant.  
Main other criticisms of this paper may be categorized into the following four points. 
First, rigorously speaking, we do not assume that price movements themselves contain some 
information regarding the predictions of agents in the market, therefore, it should be 
smoothly and immediately reflected onto the predictions of agents who does not possess the 
information in advance, while, in our model, in the period of speculation, an informationally 
inferior agent (non-speculator) is “perfectly insensitive” also to the price movements in 
disequilibrium at least until the new equilibrium price reaches. However, it is rather easy to 
generalize this model by constructing the intermediate equilibrium process between 
“perfectly insensitive” as in this paper and “perfectly sensitive” as an opposite side, and 
above all, the economic rationality (the positive profitability) in “taking a plunge into 
speculation one second in advance to someone else even on imperfect information”, 
paradoxically justifies the setting of our paper. Second, the dynamic process in this paper is 
limited at most over three periods, and the derived equilibrium is, rigorously speaking, not 
necessarily the sustainable equilibrium calculated over an infinite time horizon. Also as for 
this point, it is quite possible to derive, keeping the incorporation of the information 
production mechanism. Although we plan to modify the model in consideration of these two 
points, it is rather clear that all of the propositions presented in this paper will not be 
altered at all because of the modification. Specifically, the proof of Lemma 1 shows that 
Proposition 4 always applies in any modified models, and furthermore that there must exist 
at least one agent who becomes worse off as long as there exist probabilistically multiple 
equilibria paths on account of speculation, or as long as at least one equilibrium allocation is, 
even if it is not probabilistic, distinct from the initial one. Third, our model does not set any 
production function, although the coefficient of risky asset utility can be regarded as some 
value representing its productivity. As for this point, further elaborate work is left for future 
with assuming the endogenous effect of capital accumulation or with assuming 
increasing-return-to-scale (IRS) technology. However, we have already verified that in a 
simple model under constant-return-to-scale (CRT) technology and perfect mobility of 
capital and labor, all of our propositions are not drastically altered although the social 
welfare itself is kept constant. Fourth criticism is related with the definition of “information” 
in this paper, which might be quite controversial. For example, instead assume that 
two-country economy, a developed country with high productivity and a developing country 
with low productivity, and the information is defined as something, which enhances the low 
productivity of a developing country for sure, like the intellectual property rights or etc, and 
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which can be easily internalized and transacted with price within the economy. In these 
settings, needless to comment and as a matter of course, the foreign direct capital flow 
accompanying such “information” is strongly expected to increase the ex-ante social welfare 
as well as the welfare of the developing country at least in the long run. On the other hand, 
repeatedly, the definition of Shannon, as in our model, merely arouses the mean-preserving 
spread in terms of prediction, however also gives a speculator enough economic incentives, 
because of no-correlation with the prior information set, to take advantage of the produced 
information without trading (internalizing) it with market price, which, if it happens, in 
turn surely leads to the negative externality, as ordinarily observed even in the “mature” 
financial market like domestic markets in developed countries, where there does not exist 
any prior inequality in knowledge or any prior asymmetry in information, as well as in the 
international financial markets.  
The model in this paper might have some room for further elaboration and for 
further extension in various aspects. For example, it would be very helpful to apply this 
model to a more specific concrete economic system within an open economy framework. Thus, 
we strongly believe that this paper is rather meaningful as the first and essential step for 
further analysis. 
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Appendix 1 
The necessary F.O.C. conditions, in which (2.10) is satisfied, are as following. 
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Now each agent’s utility function is defined by (2.5). At period 0, also assume that the initial 
endowment allocation is in equilibrium and given by (2.12) (That is, 0x  is located on pX ). 
Then, we have: 
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q  (A1.2)  
Note that abb == 2010 , and 0,120,11 xx = , 0,220,21 xx = . (A1.2) does not depend on s, the 
parameter which measures the ratio of both agents’ economic initial wealth (endowments).  
In general, if 21 tt bb = , then the equilibrium allocation, ),( ,2,1 ttt xxx = , necessarily 
satisfies tt xx ,12,11 =  and tt xx ,22,21 = , so that tx  lies on the pX  as defined by (2.13). 
Furthermore, the following necessary F.O.C. condition holds: 
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Appendix 2 
From (2.8), we can rewrite (1) of (4.1) as following: 
[ ] { })()1()()(|)( 1,20211.21211,1111, ------- -++ºF tiiittiiittiiittii xuxuxuxUE bb  (A2.1) 
Also,  
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 where )(~ lDiit =b  is defined in (2.7).    (A2.2) 
In (A2.2), the term, [ ]ititisi DxUE 1, |))(( -F  is the ex-ante expected utility for declaring the 
bundle pair for speculation, )(, itis Dx , under the last information set, it 1-F , while the term, 
[ ]}{,|))(( 1, lDlDxUE iititisi =F= - , is the ex-post expected utility for each actually realized 
bundle, )(, lDx itis = , with the occurrence, lDi =  as well as the last information set, 
i
t 1-F . 
We can easily prove that, if 1,, )( -= tiitis xDx  for all )1,0( == llDi , then (A2.1) and (A2.2) 
are the same. 
Also we have: 
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t
ii
t
i
ti PPDob 01111 )1()|1(Pr --- -+=F= bb   
)1)(1()1()|0(Pr 01111 iitiititi PPDob --+-=F= --- bb , 
ii
t
i
ti PDMob 111 )|1,1(Pr -- =F== b , )1()|0,1(Pr 111 iititi PDMob -=F== -- b   
ii
t
i
ti PDMob 011 )1()|1,0(Pr -- -=F== b , )1)(1()|0,0(Pr 011 iititi PDMob --=F== -- b  
       (A2.3) 
Furthermore, 
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i
t lDob
lDMoblDMoblD
-
-
- F=
F====F===b  (A2.4) 
Plugging (A2.3) into (A2.4), we get (2.7). 
From (A2.4), it is easy to verify (4.4): 
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 )0(~*)|0(Pr)1(~*)|1(Pr 111 =F=+=F== --- iititiiititiit DDobDDob bbb  (A2.5) 
 
Appendix 3 
Comparing two distinct bundle pairs for speculation; 
( ))0(),1( ==º isiss DxDxx  and ( ))0('),1('' ==º isiss DxDxx , we writeA3-1: 
')( 1 s
D
s xx i it -F  or equivalently '1 s
D
s xx iit-b , 
iff [ ] [ ]itisiitisi DxUEDxUE 11 |))('(|))(( -- F£F .   (A3.1) 
We may interpret this expression as “the bundle pair for speculation, 'sx , is at least as good 
as another bundle pair, sx  for agent i, under the information set, it 1-F , with regard to the 
information, iD .” 
Quite similarly, we write ')( 1 s
D
s xx i it -F  or equivalently '1 s
D
s xx iit-b ,  
iff [ ] [ ]itisiitisi DxUEDxUE 11 |))('(|))(( -- F<F ,   (A3.2) 
where we say “the bundle pair for speculation, 'sx , is better off than another bundle pair, 
sx  for agent i, under the information set, it 1-F , with regard to the information, iD ”. 
 
We must be very careful about the difference of a “speculation” from a “lottery”. In a lottery, 
which action (the bundle in this case) to take is randomly and independently chosen with 
some probability. On the other hand, in a speculation, the output of information, iD , is also 
a stochastic variable, but has a considerable correlation with the state of the world, M, by 
which, iD  gives some information about the true state of the world, M. For example, 
consider the distinct trials of producing information, iD , and 'iD , say, under the 
information set, it 1-F . Then, iD  and 'iD  are conditionally independent in the sense that; 
                                                   
A3-1 As a matter of course, the agent who produces a private information, (i of iD , say.), may be 
different from the agent who has the underlying utility, (i' of 'iU , say.), for example, for the case that 
an agent can observe the output information the other agent has produced. In such cases, we simply 
describe (A3.1), for example, as: 
')( ' 1 s
D
s xx i it -F  or equivalently '' 1 s
D
s xx iit-b , 
iff [ ] [ ]itisiitisi DxUEDxUE 1'1' |))('(|))(( -- F£F  
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)|''(Pr*)|(Pr)|'',(Pr jMlDobjMlDobjMlDlDob iiii ========  (A3.3) 
for all l, l’, and j. But, in general, it does not hold that: 
)|''(Pr*)|(Pr)|'',(Pr 111 itiitiitii lDoblDoblDlDob --- F=F==F==  
On the other hand, for the outputs of distinct trials of a lottery, iL , and 'iL , say, it must 
always hold that: 
)|''(Pr*)|(Pr)|'',(Pr 111 itiitiitii lLoblLoblLlLob --- F=F==F==  (A3.4) 
for all l, l’, and it 1-F . 
Since the agent’s utility is state dependent, changing the action according to iD  may be 
able to lead to an increase in the agent’s expected utility, even if the utility has a risk averse 
form, i.e., is a concave function.  
Figure 4(a) gives us a good example, which explains equilibrium transitions of Case (A) at 
period 1. The initial equilibrium point is the allocation A  at period 0. At period 1, agent 1 
produces her private information, and the equilibrium point moves to the allocation B , if 
11 =D , and moves to the allocation C , if 01 =D . Let us denote the allocated bundle for 
agent 1 at A, B and C or etc, respectively by 1A , 1B  and 1C  or etc. Clearly, under the 
information set, 10F  (or, equivalently with the prior prediction, 10b ), 11 10 AB b  holds. 
On the other hand, with the occurrence of 11 =D  as well as the information set, 10F , (or, 
equivalently with the posterior prediction, )1(~ 111 =Db ), we have 1)1(~1 111 BA D =b . Quite 
similarly, while, under the information set, 10F  (or, equivalently with the prior prediction, 
1
0b ), 11 10 AC b  holds, on the other hand, with the occurrence of 01 =D  as well as the 
information set, 10F , (or, equivalently with the posterior prediction, )0(~ 111 =Db ), we have 
1
)0(~
1
1
1
1
CA D =b . Since the preference represented by the expected utility, (2.8), shows 
convexity, a lottery which, for example, comprises the bundle 1B  with any arbitrary 
probability r, and the bundle 1C  with probability 1-r, denoted by 11 )1( CrBr ×-Å× , is 
worse off than another lottery, which comprises the bundle 1A  with probability 1. That is: 
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  111 1)1( 1
0
ACrBr ××-Å× b     (A3.5) 
(A3.5) also holds even when )|1((Pr 01 F== Dobr . 
However, because of the reason described above, defining the bundle pair for speculation; 
 ( ))0(),1(' 1111 ==º DCDBx s  and ( ))0(),1( 1111 ==º DADAx s , 
then we have: 
  '11
0 s
D
s xx b       (A3.6) 
Repeatedly, (A3.5) and (A3.6) are not contradictory with each other. 
 
Appendix 4 
Consider Case B at period 1 in the three periods setting as described in section 3, where both 
agents have respectively an identical information production function in symmetry. This is 
equivalent with the case (b)(i), defined in (6.1). From the assumption, at period 1, the output 
information produced by an agent i, iD , is not disclosed to the other agent, -i. 
From the analogy with (5.1), we have the equilibrium conditions at period 1: 
 (1) )),(),(~,(),( 2211111110,1122111,1 lDlDqlDxxlDlDx D ====== b   
     )),(),(~,(),( 2211122210,2222111,2 lDlDqlDxxlDlDx D ====== b  
 (2) 0,20,122111,222111,1 ),(),( xxlDlDxlDlDx +===+==   (A4.1) 
And the equilibrium allocation at period 1 is denoted by: 
  )),(),,((),( 22111,222111,122111 lDlDxlDlDxlDlDx =======   (A4.2) 
Here, )(~ iiit lD =b  denotes the posterior Bayesian prediction of agent i with the occurrence, 
ii lD =  at period t. 
 
Now we just write down the equilibrium conditions at period 2 for the cases (a)(ii), (a)(iii), 
(b)(ii) and (b)(iii), as defined in (6.1). 
Period 2 of case (a)(ii) A4-1 
                                                   
A4-1 As described in (5.1), actually 1,1x  and 1,2x  are the functions of 11 lD = , so we should write 
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(1) ))(),(~,()( 12111121,1112,1 lDqlDxxlDx D ===== bb   
     ))(),(~,()( 12111221,2212,2 lDqlDxxlDx D ===== bb  
 (2) )()()()( 11,211,112,212,1 lDxlDxlDxlDx =+===+=     
        (A4.3) 
Period 2 of case (a)(iii) A4-2 
(1) )),(,,(),( 12121,1112,1 jMlDqjxxjMlDx D ====== b   
     )),(,,(),( 12221,2212,2 jMlDqjxxjMlDx D ====== b  
 (2) )()(),(),( 11,211,112,212,1 lDxlDxjMlDxjMlDx =+====+==  
        (A4.4) 
Period 2 of case (b)(ii) A4-3 A4-4 
(1) )),(),,(~,(),( 22112221111121,1122112,1 lDlDqlDlDxxlDlDx D ======== bb   
)),(),,(~,(),( 22112221121221,2222112,2 lDlDqlDlDxxlDlDx D ======== bb  
(2) 
),(),(
),(),(
2211
1,2
2211
1,1
2211
2,2
2211
2,1
lDlDxlDlDx
lDlDxlDlDx
==+===
==+==     
        (A4.5) 
Period 2 of case (b)(iii) A4-5 
(1)  )),,(,,(),,( 22112121,1122112,1 jMlDlDqjxxjMlDlDx D ======== b   
)),,(,,(),,( 22112221,2222112,2 jMlDlDqjxxjMlDlDx D ======== b  
                                                                                                                                                     
them as )( 11,1 lDx =  and )( 11,2 lDx = , but we simplifies them just for sparing spaces. 
A4-2 The same as footnote A4-1. 
A4-3 As described in (A4.1), actually 1,1x  and 1,2x  are the functions of 11 lD =  and 22 lD = , so we 
should write them as ),( 22111,1 lDlDx ==  and ),( 22111,2 lDlDx == , but we simplifies them 
just for sparing spaces. 
A4-4 Also, assuming )( 12111 PPP == , we have:  
),(~),(~ 221121221111 lDlDlDlD ===== bb  
A4-5 Same as footnote A4-1. 
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===+===   
(A4.6) 
Now the posterior Bayesian prediction of agent i at period t, with the observable outputs, 
2211 , lDlD == , is defined as: 
  
)|,(Pr
)|,,1(Pr
}),{,|1(Pr),(~
12211
12211
221112211
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
lDlDob
lDlDMob
lDlDMoblDlD
-
-
-
F==
F====
==F=º==b
 (A4.7) 
From the analogy with (2.7), if we observe 1,1 21 == DD , for example, then: 
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If we observe 0,0 21 == DD , for example, then: 
)1)(1)(1()1)(1(
)1)(1()0,0(~ 2
0
1
01
2
1
1
11
2
1
1
11
21 PPPP
PPDD i
t
i
t
i
ti
t ---+--
--===
--
-
bb
bb   
        (A4.9) 
For other cases: 
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From these results, as in footnote A4-2, assuming 2111 PP = , we have: 
),(~),(~ 221121221111 lDlDlDlD ===== bb  
Finally, we describe the equilibrium conditions at period 1 for the “rational overreaction” 
setting, as explained in footnote 5-4. 
The “rational overreaction” setting 
(1) ))(),(,()(ˆ 111110,1111,1 lDqlDxxlDx D ===== b   
     ))(),(,()(ˆ 1120210,2211,2 lDqxxlDx D ===== abb  
 (2) 0,20,111,211,1 )(ˆ)(ˆ xxlDxlDx +==+=      
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         (A4.11) 
 
Appendix 5 
Specifically, the ex-ante (expected) welfare ratios, 1R , 2R , and SR , are defined as 
following. 
Either (a)(i) or (a)(ii) in (5.5) 
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(a)(iii) in (5.5) 
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Either (b)(i) or (b)(ii) in (5.5) 
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(b)(iii) in (5.5) 
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Appendix 6 
Proof of Proposition 4 
(a)(i): Proposition 3 already proves this case. Agent 2 will be worse off in terms of the ex-ante 
expected utility. Or, it also suffices to prove that either case, (a)(ii) or (a)(iii), cannot be 
Pareto improved, because in either case both agents surely will be better off than in case 
(a)(i). 
(b)(i): It suffices to prove that either case, (b)(ii) or (b)(iii), cannot be Pareto improved, 
because in either case both agents surely will be better off than in case (b)(i). 
 
The proofs of (a)(ii), (b)(ii), (a)(iii) and (b)(iii) can be made comprehensively and rather 
straightforwardly using Lemma 1, which is described at the last part of this section. But, we 
dare to leave each proof for each individual case in order to examine what the equilibrium 
transitions, and the corresponding predictions or the corresponding ex-post utilities are like 
for each case. 
(a)(ii): See Figure A-1. As explained in section 5, point A  is the initial equilibrium 
allocation at period 0. Furthermore, point B  is the equilibrium allocation at period 1, with 
the occurrence, 11 =D , while point C  is the equilibrium allocation with the occurrence, 
01 =D . Now assume that 11 =D  occurred. Then, at period 2, we have, from the setting of 
the model, that )1(~ 1112212 === Dbbb , assuming 2111 PP = . This is also the “objective” 
prediction based on the overall information set, }1{}1{ 1102 ===ÈF=F DD . So, as 
explained in Appendix 1, at that period, the equilibrium will reach point B~ , which is 
located on pX ( 'OO ) as denoted in Figure A-1. In this case, the ex-post expected utility of 
each agent is: 
[ ] { })(*))1(~1()(*)1(~)(}1{,|)( 2021112121111110 xuDxuDxuDxUE iiii =-+=+º=F bb  
         (A6.1) 
Now we define the associated ex-post expected utility function with pX , conditionally on 
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the occurrence, 11 =D , as following: 
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         (A6.2) 
Here ),( iii xxX =  is the bundle allocated to agent i at some arbitrary point X  on pX . 
Note that ii xx -=- 2  for i=1,2. We used the form of the utility functions defined in (2.5). 
Similarly, with the occurrence, 01 =D , the equilibrium will reach point C~ , which is also 
located on pX ( 'OO ) as denoted in Figure A-1. Then, the ex-post expected utility of each 
agent is: 
[ ] { })(*))0(~1()(*)0(~)(}0{,|)( 2021112121111110 xuDxuDxuDxUE iiii =-+=+º=F bb  
         (A6.3) 
Therefore, we can define the associated ex-post expected utility function with pX , 
conditionally on the occurrence, 01 =D , as following: 
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         (A6.4)   
Furthermore, since the initial point A  is also located on pX , the associated ex-ante 
expected utility function, which can be obtained at period 0, is defined as; 
{ }
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a
gagag
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i
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x
xuxuxuXU    (A6.5) 
where 2010 bba == . 
From (A2.5), we have; 
)(~*)1()(~*)(~ 01 11 iDiiDiii XUqXUqXU == -+=a ,    
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where )|1(Pr 01 F== Dobq .     (A6.6)A6-1 
Note that all of )(~ 11 iDi XU = , )(~ 01 iDi XU =  and )(~ ii XU a  are strictly increasing and concave 
with regard to 0³ix . 
Next, see Figure A-2.  Since all of A , B~  and C~  are located on pX , we denote each 
bundle allocated to each agent at these points by ),( iii aaA º , )~,~(~ iii bbB º  and 
)~,~(~ iii ccC º  (i=1,2).     (A6.7) 
Then the ex-ante expected utility for agent i, (i=1,2), which can be obtained by exercising 
speculation and by assuring, at period 2, the bundle pair for speculation, 
))0(~),1(~()( 1112, === DCDBDx iii , is; 
)~(~*)1()~(~* 01 11 iDiiDi CUqBUq == -+ ,     (A6.8) 
while that obtained from staying on the initial point A  at period 0 is; 
 )(~*)1()(~*)(~ 01 11 iDiiDiit AUqAUqAU == -+=a    (A6.9) 
Now we need to show that the allocation pair for speculation at period 2, 
))0(~),1(~()( 1112 === DCDBDx , cannot be ex-ante Pareto improved, compared with the 
initial allocation, A  (or equivalently, the allocation pair for speculation, 
))0(),1(( 11 == DADA ). We take two steps. 
1. From the setting regarding each agent’s prediction at each period that 
)1(~ 11111 == Dbb and ab =21  at period 1, and )1(~ 1112212 === Dbbb  at period 2, we 
can conclude both points B~  and C~  are located on the side of 'O  on pX ( 'OO ), 
viewing from point A . Necessarily, we have 11 ~ba <  and 11 ~ca <  for the part of 
agent 1, and also 22 ~ba >  and 22 ~ca >  for the part of agent 2. 
2. Therefore, )~(~)(~ 111111 11 BUAU DD == <  and )~(~)(~ 101101 11 CUAU DD == < for the part of agent 1, 
and, )~(~)(~ 212212 11 BUAU DD == >  and )~(~)(~ 202202 11 CUAU DD == >  for the part of agent 2. So, 
                                                   
A6-1 Assuming 5.0=a , we have 5.0=q .  
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from (A6.7) and (A6.8), we get: 
)(~)~(~*)1()~(~* 11101111 11 AUCUqBUq DD a>-+ ==  and 
)(~)~(~*)1()~(~* 22202212 11 AUCUqBUq DD a<-+ ==   (A6.10) 
So, at period 2, agent 2 will be worse off than at period 0, while agent 1 will be better off. 
That is, the allocation pair for speculation at period 2, ))0(~),1(~()( 1112 === DCDBDx , 
cannot be ex-ante Pareto improved, compared with the initial allocation, A . Then the proof 
is done. (Q.E.D.) 
(b)(ii): See Figure A-3 as well as Figure 4(b). From the argument in section 5, we know that 
the equilibrium allocation point might shift from the initial allocation, A , only in case that 
}0,1{ 01 == DD  or }1,0{ 01 == DD  has occurred. In other cases, }1,1{ 01 == DD  or 
}0,0{ 01 == DD , the equilibrium will remain at point A . Let D~  and E~  denote the 
equilibrium allocation points with the occurrence }0,1{ 01 == DD  and }1,0{ 01 == DD , 
respectively. Then, although, the allocations for speculation, unconditionally on 0F , are 
quadruple, where; 
))0,0(),1,0(~),0,1(~),1,1((),( 21112121212 ========= DDADDEDDDDDADDx , 
        (A6.11)A6-2 
we have only to consider, conditionally, the only former two corresponding cases. A6-3 Define a 
                                                   
A6-2 So, the bundles for speculation allocated to each agent i, unconditionally on 0F , are also 
quadruple, that is: 
))0,0(),1,0(~),0,1(~),1,1((),( 21112121212, ========= DDADDEDDDDDADDx iiiii
 
A6-3 Strictly speaking, this description needs more neat explanation. Assuming )( 12111 PPP == , the 
conditional expectation of the Bayesian prediction, ),(~ 211 DDib , on L  or on 
}0,0{}1,1{ 0101 ==È==ºL DDDD , are botha ’s respectively. That is: 
  ab
b
===L==
+==L==
)1,0(~*)|}1,0({Pr
)0,1(~*)|}0,1({Pr
21121
21121
DDDDob
DDDDob
i
i
 and 
ab
b
===L==
+==L==
)0,0(~*)|}0,0({Pr
)1,1(~*)|}1,1({Pr
21121
21121
DDDDob
DDDDob
i
i
 
Since, under L , the equilibrium allocation does stay at the initial point A , and the conditional 
expectation of Bayesian prediction on L  is, as clear from the second equality, the same as the initial 
prediction,a , so the conditional expected utility on L  is exactly the same as the ex-ante expected 
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set of events, }1,0{}0,1{ 0101 ==È==ºL DDDD . Both of these two points, D~  and 
E~ , are located on pX , because 2212 bb =  always holds. Then, the allocation pair for 
speculation, conditionally on L , would be, at period 2: 
  ))1,0(~),0,1(~()|,( 1121212 ====ºL DDEDDDDDx .  (A6.12) 
Assuming )( 12111 PPP == , we have; 
for }0,1{ 01 == DD , abbbb ======== )0,1(~)0,1(~ 212121112212 DDDD   and, 
for }1,0{ 01 == DD , abbbb ======== )1,0(~)1,0(~ 212121112212 DDDD . (A6.13) 
Furthermore,  
5.0)|}0,1({Pr 21 =L== DDob  
5.0)|}1,0({Pr 21 =L== DDob      (A6.14)A6-4 
In either case, the subjective or objective predictions of both agents at period 2 are all the 
same as the initial prediction, abb == 2010 . See Figure A-4. The conditional expected 
utility of the allocation pair, ))1,0(~),0,1(~()|,( 1121212 =====L DDEDDDDDx , 
conditionally on L , of each agent is )~(~*5.0)~(~*5.0 iiii EUDU aa +  for i=1,2, while that of 
the initial allocation A  is just )(~ ii AU a . Define )~,~(~ iii ddD º  and )~,~(~ iii eeE º  (i=1,2). 
Since )(~ ii XU a  is strictly increasing and concave with respect to ix , but strictly 
decreasing with respect to )2( ii xx -=- , there does not exist any point, A~ , say, where 
)~,~(~ iii aaA º , on pX , such that; 
 )~(~)~(~*5.0)~(~*5.0 iiiiii AUCUBU aaa >+  both for i=1,2. (A6.15) 
                                                                                                                                                     
utility (under 0F ) of point A . Therefore, we do not have to consider the set, L , in order to examine 
the Pareto improvement.     
A6-4 )1()|}1,0({Pr)|}0,1({Pr 11021021 PPDDobDDob -=F===F==  
 51 
So, neither the conditional allocation pair on L , )|,( 212 LDDx , can be ex-ante Pareto 
improved compared with the initial allocation A , nor, therefore, can the unconditional 
allocations for speculation, ),( 212 DDx . (Q.E.D.) 
(a)(iii): See Figure A-5(a). We denote each equilibrium allocation at period 2, ),( 12 MDx  for 
each realization of 1D  at period 1 and each realization of M , by 1~B , 0~B , 1~C  and 0~C , 
respectively. That is, the allocations for speculation would be, at period 2:A6-5 
))0,0(~),1,0(~),0,1(~),1,1(~(),( 1011101112 ========= MDCMDCMDBMDBMDx  
         (A6.16) 
Clearly all of points, 1
~B , 0~B , 1~C  and 0~C , are located on pX , because 
)(2212 jM === bb .  
Now we use the following ex-ante (expected) social welfare; 
[ ] [ ]0,2220,1110 |)(*|)(*)|( F+F=F ttt xUExUExW dd  for t=1,2  (3.1) 
where )/( 12111 --- += llld ii , and il  is agent i's marginal expected utility of initial 
income at the initial period 0. This definition has some convenient property to examine the 
Pareto improvement of ),( 12 MDx , compared with the initial allocation, )(0 Ax = . As 
shown in footnote 3-2, by simple calculation, we easily get 
))1()1/(()1(1 aaa sss ++--=d  and ))1()1/(()1(2 aaa sss ++-+=d , in which id ’s do 
not depend on i0b ’s, assuming 2010 bb = . This implies that with any realization of the 
information, iD ’s, or equivalently, with any objective prediction, tb ’s, or under any 
arbitrary overall information set, ),( sayt X=F , the ex-post (not ex-ante) social welfare is 
maximized at the initial allocation point, A . That is, )|()|( X¢³X AWAW  for any 
arbitrary information set, X , and for any arbitrary allocation point, A¢ . Therefore, from 
(3.1), we have; 
                                                   
A6-5 We also denote each bundle allocated to agent i at each allocation point as: 
)~,~(~ 111 iii bbB º , )~,~(~ 000 iii bbB º , )~,~(~ 111 iii ccC º , )~,~(~ 000 iii ccC º  (i=1,2).  
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)|)((
})0,0{|(*})1,0{|(*
})0,1{|(*})1,1{|(*
})0,0{|~(*})1,0{|~(*
})0,1{|~(*})1,1{|~(*
)|),((
0
0
100101
110111
10001101
10101111
01
2
F=£
==+==+
==+==£
==+==+
==+==
=F
xAW
MDAWzMDAWz
MDAWzMDAWz
MDCWzMDCWz
MDBWzMDBWz
MDxW
  
         (A6.17) 
where )|,(Pr 01 F=== jMlDobz lj , and of course, 100011011 =+++ zzzz . 
Since 0>id  for i=1,2, we conclude that, on account of speculation, at least one agent must 
be worse off at period 2 than at period 0, in terms of the ex-ante expected utility. Then the 
proof is done.A6-6 (Q.E.D.) 
(b)(iii): See Figure A-5(b). In this case, we define four possible equilibria allocations, 1
~D , 
0
~D , 1~E  and 0~E , where the quadruple allocations for speculation, conditionally on 
}1,0{}0,1{ 0101 ==È==ºL DDDD , at period 2, are described as: 
))0,1,0(~),1,1,0(~
),0,0,1(~),1,0,1(~()|,,(
210211
21021121
2
======
======ºL
MDDEMDDE
MDDDMDDDMDDx  (A6.18) A6-7 
Similarly as in the proof in (b)(ii) of Proposition 4, we just need to focus on the set, L , that 
is, on these four points of equilibria allocations, 1
~D , 0~D , 1~E  and 0~E  described in (A6.18). 
Clearly, all of points, 1
~D , 0~D , 1~E  and 0~E , are located on pX , because 
)(2212 jM === bb . Then, almost the same argument as in the proof of (a)(iii) applies by 
replacing 1
~B , 0~B , 1~C  and 0~C , with 1~D , 0~D , 1~E  and 0~E , respectively. (Q.E.D.) 
As a matter of fact, from the argument made in the proof of (a)(iii), derivatively we have the 
                                                   
A6-6 Actually this argument can be applied for the proofs of (a)(ii) and (b)(ii) (of Proposition 4), as well as 
(b)(iii). 
A6-7 Therefore, each allocation point is described as: 
  )1,0,1(~ 2121 ==== MDDxD , )0,0,1(~ 2120 ==== MDDxD ,  
)1,1,0(~ 2121 ==== MDDxE , )0,1,0(~ 2120 ==== MDDxE .  
1
~D  and 0~D  may be a little confusing notations, but they should be clearly distinguished from iD ’s, 
which are the private information produced by agent i.     
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following lemma, which can be applied to the comprehensive proof of Proposition 4. 
Lemma 1: Define the ex-post (expected) social welfare at period t; 
[ ] [ ]tttttt xUExUExW F+F=F |)(*|)(*)|( ,222,111 dd  for t=1,2  (3.1) 
where )/( 12111 --- += llld ii , and il  is agent i's marginal expected utility of initial 
income at the initial period 0. Then, with any realization of the information, iD ’s, or 
equivalently, with any objective prediction, tb ’s, or under any arbitrary overall information 
set, ),( sayt X=F , the ex-post social welfare is maximized at the initial allocation point, 
A .   
         
Proof of Proposition 5 
It just suffices to show that the ex-ante Pareto efficiency cannot be attained, because not 
being ex-ante Pareto efficient necessarily implies not being the ex-ante social welfare 
maximized. (See footnote 6-6.) 
We use the following lemma.  
Lemma 2: If with some possible occurrences of iD ’s, at least one of the possible equilibria 
allocations is not the ex-post Pareto optimum, then the overall possible equilibria allocations 
are not the ex-ante Pareto optimum. 
 
(a)(i) or (b)(i): This is clear. In these transition processes, some or all (that is, at least one) of 
the possible equilibria allocations are not located on pX , which is an identical objective 
Pareto set for any occurrences of iD ’s. So, some of the possible equilibria allocations are not 
ex-post Pareto optimal. Therefore, from Lemma 2, the overall possible equilibria allocations 
are not ex-ante Pareto optimal. (Q.E.D.) 
(a)(iii): See Figure A-6. We use the same notations as the proof in (a)(iii) of Proposition 4. In 
addition, define the associated ex-post expected utility functions with pX , conditionally on 
the occurrence, 1=M , and on 0=M , respectively, as following:  
 agg -+=+º 11211211 )}({)()()(~ iiiiiii xxuxuXU  
 agg -+=+º 10210210 )}({)()()(~ iiiiiii xxuxuXU   (A6.19) 
Then, assuming )( 12111 PPP == , the ex-ante expected utility of the bundles for speculation, 
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),( 12, MDx i , is: 
)~(~*)1()~(~*)1()~(~*)1)(1()~(~*
)~(~*)|0,0(Pr)~(~*)|1,0(Pr
)~(~*)|0,1(Pr)~(~*)|1,1(Pr
0
0
11
1
10
0
11
1
1
0
0
011
1
01
0
0
011
1
01
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
CUPCUPBUPBUP
CUMDobCUMDob
BUMDobBUMDob
aaaa -+-+--+=
F==+F==+
F==+F==
 
         (A6.20) 
 
Define two points, H  and I , on pX , where;  
)~)1(~,~)1(~( 1111 iiiii cvbvcvbvH -+-+º  and )~)1(~,~)1(~( 0000 iiiii cwbwcwbwI -+-+º  for 
i=1,2, and;  
))1)(1(/()1(~ 11111 PPPDv i --+==º aaab  
))1()1(/()1()0(~ 11111 PPPDw i aaab -+--==º .  (A6.21) 
Since )(~1 ii XU  and )(~ 0 ii XU  are strictly increasing and concave with respect to ix , the 
allocations for speculation; 
))0,0(),1,0(),0,1(),1,1(( 1111 ======== MDIMDHMDIMDH , is at least as 
good as ),( 12, MDx i  for both agents i=1,2. Then the proof is done. (Q.E.D.) 
(b)(iii): Similarly as in the proof of (b)(iii) of Proposition 4, we just need to focus on the set, 
L , that is, on the four points of equilibria allocations, 1~D , 0~D , 1~E  and 0~E  described in 
(A6.18). Then, almost the same argument as in the proof of (a)(iii) applies by replacing 1
~B , 
0
~B , 1~C  and 0~C , with 1~D , 0~D , 1~E  and 0~E , respectively. (Q.E.D.) 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
(b)(i): It suffices to prove that, in either case, (b)(ii) or (b)(iii), this proposition holds, because 
in either case both agents will be surely better off than in case (b)(i). 
(b)(ii): We use the same notations as those used so far. From the assumption, we have 0=s , 
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which implies that both agents have initially the same bundle, that is, )1,1(0,20,1 == xx , 
and ),( 0,20,10 xxxA == . Note that point A  is the middle point of )( pXOO ¢ . Similarly 
as in the previous proofs, we just focus on the set, L . Since now the economic system is 
geographically in the complete symmetry, the equilibrium paths; 
  ))0,1((~))0,1(()( 2122110 ===®===®= DDxDDDxDxA  and, 
))1,0((~))1,0(()( 2122110 ===®===®= DDxEDDxExA , (A6.22) 
are geographically in symmetry with regard to the initial point, A . So, using the notations 
defined in (A6.7), we have: 
CBA ~*5.0~*5.0 +=  so that iii cba ~*5.0~*5.0 +=  (i=1,2).  
That is, point A  is exactly the middle point of CB ~~ . Now define the ex-ante social welfare: 
[ ] [ ]0,2220,1110 |)(*|)(*)|( F+F=F ttt xUExUExW dd  for t=1,2  (3.1) 
 where 5.021 == dd  
Note that in this case, that is, with 0=s , two definitions described in footnote 3-2 just 
coincide with each other. Then, as discussed in the proof of Proposition 4;  
[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]L=+L==L=£ L+L=L |))((*5.0|))((*5.0)|)(( |)),((*5.0|)),((*5.0)|),(( 0,2220,1110 21
2,2
221
2,1
121
2
xAUExAUExAW
DDxUEDDxUEDDxW  
        (A6.23)A6-8 
where 5.0)|}0,1({Pr 21 =L== DDob . 
From the symmetry, we also have: 
[ ] [ ]L=L |)),((|)),(( 212,22212,11 DDxUEDDxUE  and, 
[ ] [ ]L==L= |))((|))(( 0,2220,111 xAUExAUE   (A6.24) 
Therefore, it must hold that, for i=1,2: 
[ ] [ ]L=£L |))((|)),(( 0,111212,11 xAUEDDxUE   (A6.25) 
Then the proof is done. (Q.E.D.) 
(b)(iii): Almost the same argument as in the proof of (b)(ii) applies. (Q.E.D.) 
                                                   
A6-8 Using the same notations as in the proof of (b)(ii) in Proposition 4, we have, for i=1,2: [ ] )~(~*5.0)~(~*5.0|)),(( 212, iiiiii EUDUDDxUE aa +=L , and [ ] )(~|)( 0, iiii AUxUE a=L  
 56 
 
 
 
 
Y: Yes.  N: No.  U: Uncertain (It is not proved.)  D: It depends on parameters. 
(U)(1): Ex-ante Pareto improved? (U)(2): Ex-ante Pareto optimal?   
(V)(1): Ex-ante social welfare improved? (V)(2): Ex-ante social welfare maximized? 
(W): Ex-post Pareto optimal? 
(X)(1): True state-based Pareto improved?  (X)(2): True state-based Pareto optimal? 
(Y): First best Pareto optimal? 
(Z): Second best Pareto optimal? 
*: The weight of each agent is equally set at 5.021 == dd . 
**: The weight of each agent is set at )/( 12111 --- += llld ii , where il  is agent i's 
marginal expected utility of initial income at the initial period 0. 
 
Note: We exclude the exceptional cases, in which all equilibrium paths at period 1 or 2 
accidentally come back to the initial allocation, A , say, or to the same allocation with each 
other. 
 
Table 
 (a)(i) (b)(i) (a)(ii) (b)(ii) (a)(iii) (b)(iii) 
(1) N N N N N N (U) 
(2) N N U U N N 
(1) N N D D D D (V)* 
(2) N N U U N N 
(1) N N N N N N (V)** 
(2) N N N N N N 
(W) N N Y Y Y Y 
(1) N N N N N N (X) 
(2) N N N N N N 
(Y) N N Y Y Y Y 
(Z) D D Y Y Y Y 
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